Guía sobre Ciberseguridad y protección de datos de la INTOSAI


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05th Apr 2023

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Goal Chairs collaboration
psc -CBC -KSC
Quality Assurance Certificate of the Chair of the INTOSAI Working
Group on
Technology Audit (WGIT
This is to certify that Cybersecurity and Data Protection Audit Guideline which is placed
at level 2 (two) of Quality Assurance as defined in the paper on “Quality Assurance on
Public goods developed outside Due Process” approved by the INTO SAl Governing Board
in November 2017 has been developed by following the Quality Assurance processes as
detailed below:
I. The project proposal was developed by the team in consultation with INTOSAI
WGITA members;
11. The project was discussed during the 30th and 31st annual WGITA meeting
held virtually, in 2021 and 2022, respectively;
111. A draft document was circulated to the INTOSAI community on 15 July 2022
and was exposed for 45 days (from 15 July 2022 to 30 August 2022) for review and
feedback; Feedback received was duly considered for finalization of the document.
IV. The finalized draft document was hosted on the WGITA website and was
circulated to WGITA members in October 2022. Additional feedback received was duly
considered for the final product.
The product developed is consistent with relevant INTOSAI Principles and Standards. The
structure of the product is in line with the drafting convention of non-IFPP documents.
The product is valid till 25 October 2023 and if it is not reviewed and updated by 25
October 2023, it will cease to be a public good of INTOSAI developed outside the Due
Girish C andra Murmu
Chair of INTOSAI Working Group on
Information Technology Audit

Goal Chairs
psc -cac -KSC
Quality Assurance Certificate of the Chair of
Knowledli:e Sharinli: and
Knowledli:e Services Committee (KSC)
Based on the assurance provided by the Chair of the INTOSAI Working group on
Information Technology Audit (WGITA) and the assessment by the Goal Chair, it is
certified that Cybersecurity and Data Protection Audit Guideline which is placed at level
2 (two) of Quality Assurance as defined in the paper on "Quality Assurance on Public
goods developed outside Due Process" approved by the INTOSAI Governing Board in
November 2017 has been developed by following the Quality Assurance processes as
detailed in the Quality Assurance Certificate given by the Working Group Chair.
The product is valid till 25 October 2023 and if it is not reviewed and updated by 25
October 2023, it will cease to be a public good of INTOSAI developed outside the Due
Girish Chandra Murmu
Chair of Knowledge Sharing and
Knowledge Services Committee

1 Table of Content s

1 Table of Contents ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……. 1
I. Introduction ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………….. 3
1.1 Background ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 3
1.2 Structure of this guideline document ………………………….. ………………………….. …. 3
1.3 Audience ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………. 4
1.4 Key concepts and definitions ………………………….. ………………………….. …………… 4
1.5 Key Cybersecurity and Data Protection Standards and Frameworks ………………. 5
1.6 Cybersecurity and Data Protection Best Practices and Key Methodology ………… 7
2 Guidance during audit phases ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………….. 8
2.1 Planning and designing an audit ………………………….. ………………………….. ………. 8
2.1.1 Defining the terms of the engagement ………………………….. …………………….. 8
2.1.2 Defining the scope ………………………….. ………………………….. …………………… 9
2.1.3 Audit Skill Requirements ………………………….. ………………………….. …………. 11
2.2 Conducting ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …….. 12
2.2.1 General Audit Process ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………. 12
2.2.2 Define the security baseline ………………………….. ………………………….. …….. 12
2.2.3 Define the method of scoring against the selected framework ……………….. 13
2.2.4 Principles for specific audit areas ………………………….. ………………………….. 15
2.2.3 Considerations ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. . 18
2.2.4 Penetration Testing ………………………….. ………………………….. …………………….. 19
2.3 Reporting ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……….. 19
2.3.1 Principl es ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 20
3 Auditing national cybersecurity and data protection ………………………….. ……………… 21
3.1 National Cybersecurity Strategy and Governance ………………………….. …………. 21
3.1.1 Importance of Up -To -Date National Cybersecurity Strategies ………………… 21
3.1.2 The Three Dimensions: Governmental, National, and International ………… 22
3.1.3 The Five Mandates of National Cybersecurity ………………………….. …………. 22
3.1.4 The Five Dilemmas of National Cybersecur ity ………………………….. ………… 22
3.1.5 Cybersecurity and data protection governance and oversight ………………… 23
3.1.6 Regulations by country ………………………….. ………………………….. …………… 24
3.1.7 Cybersecurity strategy and program evaluation ………………………….. ………. 27
3.1.8 National Cybersecurity Maturity Evalua tion Models ………………………….. …. 28


3.2 Cybersecurity evaluation to critical processes and resources ………………………. 30
3.2.1 Critical Infrastructures ………………………….. ………………………….. …………….. 30
3.2.2 General Auditing of Critical National Infrastructure ………………………….. ….. 32
3.2.3 Semi -Specific Auditing of Cr itical National Infrastructure ………………………. 40
3.2.4 Specific Auditing of Critical National Infrastructure by Sectors ……………….. 41
3.2.5 National Resilience / Disaster Recovery ………………………….. ………………… 46
3.3 Auditing National Cyber Incident Response ………………………….. ………………….. 51
3.3.1 The role of government entities in charge of cyber incident response. …….. 51
3.3.2 Entities Responsible for National Cybersecurity. ………………………….. ……… 51
3.3.3 CERT/CSIRT functions ………………………….. ………………………….. …………… 52
3.3.4 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and Computer Security
Incident Response Team (CSIRT) ………………………….. ………………………….. ………… 53
3.3.5 Guide for cybersecurity CSIRT ………………………….. ………………………….. … 54
3.3.6 Assessing the maturity level of a CSIRT ………………………….. ………………… 59
4 Considerations of cybersecurity and data protection by sector ………………………….. .. 62
4.1 Key Cybersecurity Guidance and Criteria for Critical Infrastructure Sectors ……. 64
4.2 Challenges, Risks, and Threats for Critical Infrastructure Sectors …………………. 64
4.2.1 Cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure sectors ………………………….. . 65
4.3 Considerations for Auditing Critical Infrastructure Sectors ………………………….. . 69
4.3.1 Identifying Key Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Actors ………………………….. …. 69
4.3.2 Identifying Stakeholder Roles and Regulatory Frameworks …………………… 72
4.3.3 Identifying Potential Challenges or Audit Findings ………………………….. …… 73
4.4 Example Audit Reports on Critical Infrastructure ………………………….. ……………. 75
4.4.1 Government -Wide Critical Infrastruct ure Reviews ………………………….. ……. 75
4.1.1. Sector -Specific Critical Infrastructure Reviews ………………………….. ………… 75
Appendix – Acronyms and abbreviations ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 77


I. Introduction 1

1.1 Background
Government agencies use information systems and electronic data to carry out their
missions. Protecting these systems and the information that resides on them is essential to
prevent unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss that can lead to serious
consequences and result in substantial harm to individuals and the government. Specifically,
ineffective protection of information technology (IT) systems and information can potentially
result in :

Inappropriate access to and disc losure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information;
• Loss or theft of resources, including money and intellectual property;
• Loss of privacy, emotional distress, or reputational harm;
• Loss of public confidence; or
• High costs to remediate the e ffects of a breach.

These IT systems are highly complex and dynamic, technologically diverse, and often
geographically dispersed. This complexity increases the difficulty in identifying, managing,
and protecting the numerous operating systems, applicatio ns, and devices comprising the
systems and networks. Compounding the risk, systems and networks used by government
agencies and critical infrastructure are also often interconnected with other internal and
external systems and networks, including the inter net. Government agencies and critical
infrastructures — such as energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial
services — are dependent on IT systems and electronic data to carry out operations and to
process, maintain, and report essential info rmation. The security of these systems and data
is vital to public confidence and security, prosperity, and well -being. Thus, it is imperative to
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of this information and effectively
respond to data b reaches and security incidents when they occur.

1.2 Structure of this guideline document
The purpose of this guideline document is to integrate and facilitate access to useful
information and guidance pertaining to cybersecurity 2 and data protection. This document is
not meant to be an exhaustive guide for auditors but could be used as a starting point to
assist auditors in identifying criteria for further review.

This document includes four chapters to help auditors plan, execu te, and report on audits
related to cybersecurity and data protection. These chapters are:

Chapter Description
1. Introduction Provides an overview of the rest of the guide, including key
definitions, concepts, and best practices.
1 Please be informed that the reach of this document is to provide auditors / audit public an initial overview of the
state that cybersecurity and data protection guard under a global reach hoping to deepen on the subjects referred
in a second part of the d ocument. 2 For consistency purposes, throughout the document the term “cybersecurity” is used instead of “cyber security”.


2. Guidance during
audit phases
Provides general guidance on the planning, conducting, and
reporting phases of an audit, including the principals for
conducting cybersecurity and data protection audits.
3. Auditing national
cybersecurity and data
Provides highlights on a) the importance of national
cybersecurity strategies and attributes of such a strategy, b)
national cybersecurity considerations in terms of critical
processes such as critical infrastructures, and c) examples of
national and regional cybersecurity benchmark studies.
4. Considerations of
cybersecurity and data
protection by sectors
Provides an overview of critical infrastructure sectors, such as
the financial, communications, and energy sectors; key threats
to such sectors; considerations for auditing critical
infrastructure sectors; and examples of relevant reports for
several sectors.

1.3 Audience
This guide is intended for use by auditors responsible for reviewing cybersecurity and data
protection. Auditors may use the information presented in this document to help facilitate
their planning, evaluating, and reporting of audits. The material presented in this document
assumes that the reader has a general knowledge of auditing standards.

1.4 Key conce pts and definitions

• Access controls: Include both logical and physical controls related to, among other
things, protection of system boundaries, identification and authentication, and
physical security of facilities .
• Availability: Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information .
• Cloud security: A combination of policies, controls, procedures, and technologies
that work together to protect cloud -based infrastructures and systems .
• Compliance controls: Controls that enforce information secur ity requirements and
deal with privacy laws and cybersecurity standards designed to minimize security
• Confidentiality: Preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure,
including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary inf ormation .
• Critical infrastructure: Refers to systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to a country or organization that their incapacity or destruction would
debilitate national security, economic stability, public health or safety, or any
combination of these .
• Cybersecurity: Protection and restoration of technology such as computers,
electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire
communication, and electronic communication, to ensure its availability, integrity ,
and confidentiality .
• Data privacy: Assurance that the confidentiality of, and access to, certain
information about an entity is adequately protected.
• Data protection: The practice or process of safeguarding information from
corruption and loss .
• Information security: The protection of information and information systems from
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order
to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability .


• Integrity: Guarding against im proper information modification or destruction and
includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity .
• Network security: A practice of securing networks against unauthorized access,
misuse, interference, or interruption of service .
• Personally id entifiable information (PII): Any information that can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, date and place of birth, or
identification number, and other types of personal information that can be linked to
an individual, s uch as medical, educational, financial, and employment information .
• Procedural controls: Controls, including security awareness education, security
frameworks, compliance training, and incident response plans and procedures, that
prevent, detect, or minimi ze security risks to any physical assets such as computer
systems, data centers, and even filing cabinets .
• Technical controls: Security controls for an information system that are
implemented and executed through mechanisms in the hardware, software, or
firmware components of the system .

1.5 Key Cybersecurity and Data Protection Standards and Frameworks
This section provides a description of relevant best practices across all of the chapters of
the guide. This section is not meant to be an exh austive list of best practices but can help
serve as an audit starting point.

Practice (with link) Description
ISO/IEC 27000:2018
Information technology
security techniques
This document , The ISO Information Security Management
system (ISMS) , includes standards that, among other things,
provide direct support, detailed guidance and/or interpretation
for the overall process to establish, implement, maintain, and
improve an ISMS and address secto r-specific guidelines for
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
(NIST) Framework for
Improving Critical
Cybersecurity, Version 1.1
This publication describes a voluntary risk management
framework that consists of standards, guidelines, and best
practices to manage cybersecurity -related risk.
NIST Priva cy Framework
This framework is intended to help organizations identify and
manage privacy risk so they can build innovative products
and services while protecting individuals’ privacy.
NIST Special Publication
800 -34: Revision 1,
Contingency Planning
Guide for Federal
Information Systems
This document provides instructions, recommendations, and
considerations for federal information system contingency
NIST Special Publication
(SP) 800 -37, Rev. 2: Risk
Management Framework
for Information Systems
and Organizations: A
System Life Cycle
This document describes a risk management framework, that
provides a structured and flexible process for managing
security and privacy risk that includes information security
categorization; control selection, implementation, and
assessment; system and com mon control authorizations; and
continuous monitoring.


Approach for Security and

NIST SP 800 -39: Managing
Information Security Risk:
Organization, Mission, and
Information System View
This document provides guidance for an integrated,
organization -wide program for managing information security
risk to organizational operations resulting from the operation
and use of federal information systems.
NIST SP 800 -53A Rev 5:
Assessing Security and
Privacy Controls in Federal
Information Systems and
This document provides guidelines for building effective
security and privacy assessment plans and procedures for
assessing the effectiveness of security controls and privacy.
NIST SP 800 -53B: Control
Baselines for Information
Systems and Organizations
This provides suggested security and privacy contr ol
baselines for each system impact level — low -impact,
moderate -impact, and high -impact — as well as a privacy
NIST SP 800 -53 Rev 5:
Security and Privacy
Controls for I nformation
Systems and Organizations
This document provides a catalog of security and privacy
controls for information systems and organizations to protect
organizational operations and assets from a set of threats and
risks, including hostile attacks, hum an errors, natural
disasters, and privacy risks.
NIST SP 800 -55 Rev. 1:
Performance Measurement
Guide for Information
This document provides guidance on how an organi zation,
through the use of metrics, identifies the adequacy of in -place
security controls, policies, and procedures. It provides an
approach to help management decide where to invest in
additional security protection resources or identify and
evaluate nonp roductive controls.
NIST SP 800 -61, Revision
2, Computer Security
Incident Handling Guide
This publication provides guidelines for incident handling,
particularly for analyzing incident -related data and
determining the appropriate response to each incident.
NIST 800 -82 Rev. 2: Guide
to Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) Security
This document provides guidance on how to secure industrial
control systems (ICS), including supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems
(DCS), and other control system configurations such as
programmable logic controllers (PLC), while a ddressing their
unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements. The
document provides an overview of ICS and typical system
topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to
these systems, and provides recommended security
countermeas ures to mitigate the associated risks.
NIST SP 800 -115:
Technical Guide to
Information Security
Testing and Assessment
This document provides guidance to assist organizations in
planning and conducting technical information security tests
and examinations, analyzing findings, and developing
mitigation strategies. The guide provides practical
recommendations for designing, implementing, and
maintaining technical information security test and
examination processes and procedures. These can be used
for several purposes, such as finding vulnerabilities in a
system or network and verifying compliance with a policy or
other requirements.


NIST SP 800 -137:
Information Security
Continuous Monitoring
(ISCM) for Federal
Information Systems and
This special publication was developed to assist
organizations in the development of a continuous monitoring
strat egy and the implementation of a continuous monitoring
program providing visibility into organizational assets,
awareness of threats and vulnerabilities, and visibility into the
effectiveness of deployed security controls.
NIST SP 800 -161, Rev 1
(Final ): Supply Chain Risk
Management Practices for
Federal Information
Systems and Organizations
This document provides guidance to organizations on
identifying, assessing, and mitigat ing cyber supply chain

Regulation (EU) 2016/679
of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 27
This regulation requires entities to manage data securely by
implementing " appropriate technical and organizational
measures ." Technical measures mean anything from
requiring employees to use two -factor authenti cation for
accounts where personal data is stored to contracting with
cloud providers that use end -to-end encryption.
Organizational measures are things like training staff, adding
a data privacy policy to the employee handbook, or limiting
access to personal data only to those employees who need

1.6 Cybersecurity and Data Protection Best Practices and Key Methodolog y
The methodology listed below may be more prescriptive and assist an auditor in completing
audits in a repeatable manner. These may inc lude steps to be taken in an audit, explain why
the steps are important, and how an auditor should complete each step.

Methodology (with link) Description
NIST SP 800 -53A Rev 5:
Assessing Security and
Privacy Controls in Federal
Information Systems and
This document provides guidelines for building effective
secur ity and privacy assessment plans and procedures for
assessing the effectiveness of security controls and privacy.


2 Guidance during audit phases

2.1 Planning and designing an audit
This section will define high -level principles for planning and designing of cybersecurity
audits. The principles will provide guidelines on:
• Defining the terms of the engagement; and
• Defining the scope.
2.1.1 Defining the terms of the engagement
The audit should consider the cybersecurity requirements and goals of an organi zation . This
will entail analyzing industry trends to identify emerging cybersecurity risks and engaging
with senior management to understand their expectations. Understanding the organization´s
cybersecurity requirements and goals will help with identifyi ng risks to the organization and
defining the audit objective.

The following are examples of cybersecurity goals 3.
• Emerging risk is reliably identified, appropriately evaluated and adequately treated.
• Cybersecurity policies, standards and procedures are adequate, effective and
comply with regulations.
• Cybersecurity transformation processes are defined, deployed and measured.
• Attacks and breaches are identified and treated in a timely and appropriate manner.
The organization’s cybersecurity requirements and goals can be identified from the following
• Government regulations and policies;
• Frameworks, policies and procedures;
• Organization charts;
• Terms of reference;
• Minutes of meetings;
• Internal reports;
• External reports; and
• Intranet Site.
The audit objective should provide management with an assessment of the effectiveness of
cybersecurity processes, policies, procedures, governance and controls. The assessment
should focus on:
• The use of cybersecurity frameworks, standa rds, guidelines;
• Design of processes, procedures and controls; and
• Implementation of relevant controls.
The following provides examples of audit objectives 4:
• Provide management with an assessment of their cybersecurity policies and
procedures and their op erating effectiveness ;
3 Source: -/media/files/isacadp/project/isaca/articles/journal/2019/volume -2/auditing –
cybersecurity_joa_e ng_0319 4 Source: ISACA, IS Audit/Assurance Program, Cybersecurity: Based on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework


• Confirm the systems in place meet minimum compliance requirements ;
• Identify security control concerns that could affect the reliability, accuracy and
security of the enterprise data due to weaknesses in security controls ; and
• Evaluat e the effectiveness of response and recovery programs.
2.1.2 Defining the scope
The audit scope should be based on the audit objectives. The audit objectives should be
used to define the areas and aspects of cybersecurity to be covered. The following should
be c onsidered when defining the audit scope:
• Organization’s systems, IT architecture and information assets;
• Organization’s risk management and cybersecurity frameworks;
• Government and regulatory security frameworks; and
• Baseline cybersecurity framework. Risk -based Approach to Cyber security

The above factors will assist with understanding the organization’s approach to
cybersecurity. The following provides a model for implementing cybersecurity using a risk –
based approach 5. Risk -based Approac h to Cyber security
Steps Description
1. Define the
Determine the type, value and security objectives for the system
based on an assessment of the impact if it were to be compromised.
2. Risk

Assess the vulnerability of key assets and the key controls to
mitigate against the risks identified.
3. Select
Select controls for the system and tailor them to achieve desired
security objectives.
4. Implement
Implement controls for the system and its operating environment.
5. Assess
Assess controls for the system and its operating environment to
determine if they have been implemented correctly and are
operating as intended.
6. Authorize the
Authorize the system to operate based on the acceptance of the
security risks associated with its operation.
7. Monitor the
Monitor the system, and associated cyber threats, security risks and
controls, on an ongoing basis.
8. Reporting Collate audit findings a nd make recommendations for change or
improvement, including recommendations for addressing residual
risks or identified weaknesses not mitigated by controls.
Understanding the organization’s approach to cybersecurity supports a risk -based approach
to th e audit. It allows the audit to focus on important areas that are valuable to the
organization . The audit can focus on systems and information assets that the organization
should protect, and the level of protection the organization should be implementing for
5 Source: view -all-content/advice/using -information -security -manual


stronger security controls . The following considerations can assist with further enhancing
the audit scope :

• The prioritization of the defined systems can assist with targeting important systems.
Organizations would typically implement security control s for higher priority systems
as opposed to those of less importance to the organization ;
• The selected controls forms the security baseline for specific systems and, in some
cases, for all systems. The security baseline can be used as the basis for complia nce
audits if a legal and regulatory security baseline does not exist ;
• The organization’s mechanisms for assessing, authorizing and monitoring security
controls can provide an early indication of the cybersecurity maturity of the
organization . An organization with overarching framework supporting the
assessment, authorization and monitoring of security controls is likely to be mor e
mature than those that do not have such a framework ; and
• A risk and threat assessment can provide an understanding of specific risks the
organization is aiming to mitigate. The risk and threat assessments should provide
information on the intrusion proce ss for particular systems. Adversaries execute a
series of steps or stages within the intrusion process to execute a cyber -attack . The
high -level stages of targeted cyber intrusions are malicious software delivery and
execution, network propagation, and da ta exfiltration. The audit scope should include
an assessment of controls related to the intrusion process. This will help assess the
organization’s ability to mitigate cybersecurity incidents. Risk Management and Security Frameworks

The following organizations and frameworks provide examples of risk management and
cybersecurity practices that could be used to assist with scoping the audit :

• US National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) ;
• Systems and Or ganizational Controls (SOC) ;
• The US Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) ;
• International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) ;
• EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) ;
• Center for Internet Security (CIS) Con trols ;
• Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) ;
• Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) ; and
• Australian CyberSecurity Centre (ACSC) Information Security Manual (ISM) . Audit Program Development

The following aspects should be considered when developing the audit program :

• A security baseline should be identified to allow for the assessment of a minimum
level of protection against in -scope systems and information assets.
• A scoring methodology should be defined to allow for a systematic approach to
assessing the performance of cybersecurity controls. The scoring methodology will


be dependent on the audit objective and scope of the audit. The scoring methodology
should consider the following components:
o W eighted scores based on the priority or importance of the security control,
such as mandatory versus desired controls;
o Level of security control implementation, such as operation versus
documented; and
o Strength of audit evidence to support the score, suc h as inquiry would result
in a lower score and reperformance would result in a higher score.
The following provides resources that could assist with defining the security baseline :
• Australian Government’s Protective Security Policy Framework 7;
• Australian Government’s Information Security Manual 8; and
• UK Security Policy Framework 9.
2.1.3 Audit Skill Requirements
The audit scope and program will determine the security knowledge and expertise required
to execute the audit program. The foll owing factors should be considered when determining
the audit team members :

• Specialized areas and technologies being audited, such as blockchain, artificial
intelligence, encryption, and cloud -computing ;
• Tools and technology used to support cybersecurity management within the
organization ; and
• Tools and technology used by the organization to manage its IT environment.
The following provides a list of areas that audit team members should have skills, expert ise
and knowledge that would assist with performing an assessment of cybersecurity :

• Cyber and security management governance frameworks, specifically across
recognized standards, such as NIST, ISO, PSPF and the ISM ;
• Cyber and security legal and regulatory environments, specifically understanding the
government’s security criteria (requirements, policies, standards and procedures) ;
• Cyber and information security risk management, specifically performing risk
assessments ;
• System design and development lifecyc les, including agile approaches ;
• Security operations management, specifically the management of vulnerabilities and
incidents ; and
• Common hacking toolkits such as nmap, Metasploit and Kali.
Security expertise may be required to be included in the audit te am depending on the areas
being reviewed and the type of approach to testing. The following provides a list of security
certifications that may assist with addressing the resource requirements.
6 Source: 7 Source: https://www.protectivesecurity.go 8 Source: -all-content/ism 9Source: -policy -framework/hmg -security -policy -framework


Certification Description
Certified Information
Systems Security
Professional (CISSP)
Experience and skills for designing, implementing, and
monitoring a cybersecurity program.
Certified Information
Systems Auditor (CISA)
Experience and skills for assessing, designing and
implementing security controls .
Certified Information
Security Manager (CISM)
Experience and skills for managing information security,
including in governance, program development, incident and
risk management.
CompTIA Security+ Experience and skills for assessing and monitoring secu rity
management across an organization .
CompTIA Cybersecurity
Analyst (CySA+)
An IT certification that applies behavioral analytics to
networks and devices to prevent, detect and combat
cybersecurity threats through continuous security monitoring.
Certified Ethical Hacker
Demonstrates knowledge of assessing security of compu ter
systems by looking for weaknesses and vulnerabilities in
target systems, using the same knowledge and tools as a
malicious hacker, but in a lawful and legitimate manner to
assess the security posture of a target system.
Certified in Risk and
Information Systems
Control (CRISC)
A qualification that verifies your knowledge and expertise in
risk manage ment.
GIAC Security Essentials
Certification (GSEC)
Experience and skills in security operations, such as cyber
offense and defense , network secu rity, and incident

2.2 Conducting
This section will define principles for conducting the following types of audits:

• Cybersecurity capability/maturity ;
• Cyber resilience maturity ;
• Data privacy ;
• Data protection ; and
• Technical configuration .
2.2.1 General Audit Process
Cybersecurity audits can cover several areas within an organization . The execution of
cybersecurity audits can be modelled after the audit process listed in section

The principles associated with each audit process is described in the following subsections.

2.2.2 Define the security baseline
The security baseline will provide the basis for assessing the entities performance. The
security baseline should be based on the following:


• Security frameworks and stan dards used by the organization to develop and manage
its security management and controls; and
• Security legal and regulatory requirements that govern the organization’s business
If the organization has not defined this security baseline, then the security baseline should
be selected using the following considerations:

• Security frameworks and standards used in the organization’s industry and
• Security frameworks and standards used in a similar industry and jurisdiction; or
• Internationally recognized frameworks and standards.
The use of international frameworks and standards is suggested as these are likely to have
been developed by a wider community of professional associations and experts. A list of
example security frameworks and standards has been provided in Planning and designing
an audit section.

2.2.3 Define the method of scoring against the selected framework
If the security frameworks and standards do not pro vide a scoring methodology, the audit
team may want to define a scoring methodology based on the selected security frameworks
and standards. The following principles may assist with defining a scoring methodology :

• Prioritization of requirement: each frame work and standard requirement should be
given a priority. This can be determined by the importance of the requirement, where
mandatory (must) requirements have a greater score associated and desirable
(should) requirements have a lesser score ;
• Level of imp lementation: scores can be allocated to the level of implementation for a
requirement or control. Example implementation levels could be based on:
documented or designed; implemented or exists; and operational. Operational levels
has a higher score than do cumented controls ; and
• Impact on identified risks: scores can be allocated based on the impact a requirement
may have on mitigating the risks. This may be necessary as the type of control may
have less impact on mitigating the identified cybersecurity risk /threat (i.e.,
documentation and plans may be unlikely to stop an actual malware attack as
opposed to implementing a security configuration within the required system).
The scoring methodology should include the definition of the audit evidence required to
support the assessment and score. The audit evidence should support the type of scoring
attributes used. The following provides examples of audit evidence and potential score
categorization .

Audit Evidence Type Example Score
Inquiry Interviews Low
Observation Walkthroughs Low/Moderate
Inspection Review security configurations Moderate/High
Reperformance Executing a system test High


The audit team may choose to apply several factors and methods that contribute to an
overall score. For example, the following calculation could be applied.

Requirement Score = (Level of Implementation) X ( Prioritization ) X (Impact on identified

A range of scores should be defined to allow for reporting of performance, specifically
against the baseline security requirements. This can provide an indication of the gap against
required security control implementation, capability or maturity. Define t he audit procedures to support the collection of audit evidence

The audit procedures will be dependent on the areas being reviewed. The following
principles should be considered when designing audit procedures :

• Audit procedures should be based on the framework and standards. This will ensure
that the audit evidence will support the assessment against the applicable
requirements ;
• Audit procedures should be developed with the support from policy and operational
specialists. This will ensure that the meth ods used for assessing against frameworks
are likely to align to expectations of policy and operational specialists ;
• Audit procedures should be aligned to the scoring methodology. If a score is based
on the specific configuration of a security control, the n audit procedures need to be
developed to inspect security configurations against the required standard (e.g.,
password configurations) ; and
• Audit procedures should consider the use of security tools, especially those within
the organization . The use of s ecurity tools could increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of audit procedures. For example, the use of a vulnerability scanning tool
may reduce the need to source security data from systems through scripts and
programs. Vulnerability scanning and Secur ity Information and Even Management
(SIEM) tools are useful tools to incorporate into audit procedures. If the security tools
are in -house developed or highly customized , then procedures may need to be
performed to assess the integrity of the security tool and the reports being generated.
The following provides sources of audit programs that may assist with designing audit
procedures :

• NIST, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, -115.pdf
• ACSC, Cloud Assessment and Authorization – Frequently Asked Questions, -all -content/publications/cloud -assessment –
and -authorisation -frequently -asked -questions
• ISACA, Auditing Cybersecurity, –
journal/issues/2016/volume -1/auditing -cybersecurity
• ACSC, Information Security Manual, -all –


• ISACA, IS Audit Basics: Audit Program, –
journal/issues/2017/volume -4/is -audit -basics -audit -programs Perform audit procedures

The audit procedures should be performed as planned and managed as per the relevant
auditing standards and quality management processes within the audit team’s organization .
The following principle should be considered when performing audit procedures :

• Requirements that deviate from the security requirements should be supported by a
risk assessment. Organizations may choose to deviate from a security requirement
based on their specific circumstances. This deviation should at least be supported
by a robust assessment of associated risks and this sh ould be managed through the
organization’s security governance processes. Assess the audit evidence and apply a score to the areas audited

The audit evidence should be assessed using the planned scoring methodology. The scores
may need to be adjusted depe nding on the type of audit being performed. For example, if
the audit is assessing compliance, then the scores could be quite strict as a deviation is
seen as non -compliance or an exception. However, a performance audit focused on
assessing the management of cyber risks may include the evidence of risk assessments as
a factor into the performance score. It is best to determine this when defining the scoring
methodology. Assess the risks and impact associated with exceptions

An assessment of the risks asso ciated with exceptions would be applicable to any audit
engagement. This assessment should reflect back to the audit objective and the information
gathered during the planning stage of the audit. Further, the auditor is required to report its
findings to t hose charged with governing the organization . This assessment can provide:

• Insights into what risks could impact an organization to achieving business
• Information to support decision making on security initiatives and projects; and
• Support for adjusting the financial statement audit program to ensure appropriate
assurance is obtained.
2.2.4 Principles for specific audit areas Cybersecurity capability/maturity

An audit of cybersecurity capability/maturity should include a review across the following

• Cybersecurity strategy ;
• Cybersecurity risk management ;
• Program management and governance ;


• Regulatory and legal requirements ;
• Threat and vulnerability management ;
• Security incident management ;
• Security Monitoring ;
• Workforce management ;
• Third -party management ; and
• Data protection .
The following provides references to guidance to assist with auditing cybersecurity
capability/maturity :

• NIST, Cybersecurity Framework, https://www.nist.go v/cyberframework
• Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Cybersecurity
Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), bersecurity –
capability -maturity -model -c2m2
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense , Cybersecurity Maturity Model
Certification (CMMC),
• ACSC, Essential Eight Maturity Model, -all –
content/publications/essential -eight -maturity -model Cyber resilience maturity

An audit of cyber resilience maturity should include a review across the following areas :

• Business impact analysis ;
• Business continuity planning ;
• Disaster recovery planning ;
• Security incident management ;
• Threat and vulnerability management ;
• Security monitoring ;
• Third -party management ; and
• Workforce management .
The following provides references to guidance to assist with auditing cyber resilience
maturity :

• MITRE, Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework,
• MITRE, Cyber Resiliency Metrics, Measures of Effectiveness, and Scoring, -18 -2579 -cyber -resiliency –
metrics -measures -of-effectiveness -and -scoring.pdf Data Protection

An audit of data protection should include a review across th e following areas :

• Data governance ;
• Regulatory and legal requirements ;


• Data classification ;
• Data security ;
• Data quality management ;
• Information records management ; and
• Data loss prevention .
The following provides references to guidance to assist with auditing data protection :

• NIST, Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations , -53/rev -5/final
• Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Auditing data protection: a guide to ICO
data protection audits,
• Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Data Protection Impact Assessments, -organisations/guide -to-data -protection/guide -to-the -general –
data -protection -regulation -gdpr/accountability -and -governance/data -protection –
impact -assessments/
• ISACA, Best Practices for Privacy Audits, –
and -trends/newsletters/atisaca/2020/volume -6/best -practices -for -privacy -audits Technical Confi guration

An audit of technical configurations should include a review across the following areas :

• Hardening standards ;
• Configuration management ;
• Security build and testing ;
• Development lifecycles ;
• Patch management ; and
• Vulnerability management .
The following provides references to guidance to assist with auditing the above areas :

• ACSC, Guidelines for System Hardening, ew -all –
content/advice/guidelines -system -hardening
• ACSC, Hardening Linux Workstations and Servers, -all-content/publications/hardening -linux –
workstations -and -servers
• ACSC, Hardening Microsoft Windows 10 version Workstations, -all -content/publications/hardening -microsoft –
windows -10 -version -21h1 -workstations
• ACSC, Web Hardening Guidance, u/acsc/government/web -hardening -guidance
• ACSC, Securing PowerShell in the Enterprise, –
all -content/publications/ securing -powershell -enterprise


2.2.3 Considerations
This section will outline the considerations of IT risk and complexity, multi -organization
audits and the advantages and disadvantages od penetration testing. IT Risk and Complexity

Cybersecurity is important for any organization and the cybersecurity audit should consider
the organization’s cybersecurity risks. A good indicator of cybersecurity risks is an
organization’s attack surface. The attack surface is the amount of ICT equipment and
software used by an organization . The greater the attack surface, the greater the
opportunities for adversaries in finding vulnerabilities to exploit. An organization with a large
attac k surface or high cybersecurity risk rating should have a greater level of protection
measures or should have a more sophisticated cybersecurity implementation. The following
table provides examples of small, medium and large organizations :

Attack Surfac e/Cyber security Risk Rating
Small/Low Medium/Moderate Large/High
– <10 ICT equipment and software
– IT management is managed by business
– All systems are Commercial -Off -The -Shelf
(COTS) implementations
– No internet -facing systems
250 ICT
equipment and

The following table outlines a model that could be used to determine the extent of audit
testing required and has suggested areas of focus :

Attack Surface/Cyber security Risk Rating
Small/Low Medium/Moderate Large/High
Extent of Testing – Inquiry and inspection procedures.
– Assess high -level security documentation, such
as policies, procedures and work instructions.
– Assess for: automation of updates, backup and
recovery, multi -factor authentication, and
cybersecurity training.
– Assess assurance mechanisms, management
reporting and self -assessment/reporting.
– Conduct interviews of Executive Boards and
Chief Security Officers.
Inquiry, Inspection
and Observation.

The following is a list of sources of information that will assist with determining the attack
surface and/or cybersecurity risk rating :

• Hardware and software asset registers ;
• Architecture and Network diagrams ;
• Organizational Structure Diagrams ; and
• Access Control Listings, specifically privileged users with access to administrative
functions on networks, databases and applications .

19 Multi -organization Audits

The auditor may need to adjust the ir approach when auditing multiple organizations . The
guidance provided is focused on performing an audit of an organization or can be scaled to
include a small number of organizations . The auditor may want to consider the use of
surveys, questionnaires, or self -reporting to support gathering of audit evidence. The
following should be considered when taking this approach.

Survey and questionnaire design should focus on obtaining sufficient and appropriate
evidence to support the assessmen t against the scoring methodology and audit criteria. The
design should provide details on evidence requirements, especially for supporting the
responses provided by organizations . For example, an organization who states that they
have met regulatory requi rements for implementing patch management standards needs to
provide evidence supporting its response. The auditor should provide examples of evidence
to assist the accuracy of survey responses.

2.2.4 Penetration Testing
Penetration testing is an approach that can provide information on the performance of
security controls. The following are some advantages and disadvantages of using
penetration testing to support audit activities. Advantages

• Penetration tests can provide direct evidence of contro ls operating effectively. It may
provide greater evidence of the impact of control weaknesses as opposed to
highlighting the potential for an incident occurring ; and
• Penetration tests can be more efficient as some tests can be automated. Disadvanta ges

• Limiting the scope of penetration testing reduces the attack surface and reduces the
likelihood of identifying gaps in cybersecurity strategies. Conversely, allowing greater
scope may not directly test the performance of a control, however, it would p rovide
insights into broader problems within the security architecture ;
• Poorly designed penetration tests and processes may result in creating security
vulnerabilities or be used by adversaries to disguise malicious activities. It is
important for audit te ams to ensure that vulnerabilities identified and/or created
during and after penetration testing are appropriately managed and rectified. The
audit team needs to restore the organization’s systems back to its original state ; and
• Auditors need to have the necessary skills and expertise to perform penetration
testing, such as use of tools and restoration of systems.
2.3 Reportin g
The audit team will review the audit evidence in order to reach a conclusion or issue an
opinion. The audit team should evaluate whether the audit evidence obtained is sufficient
and appropriate so as to reduce the audit risk to an acceptably low level. Th e evaluation
should consider evidence to determine if it supports or contradicts the conclusions, audit


report or audit opinion. The following are principles to consider when reporting cybersecurity
audit results.

2.3.1 Principles
For audit reports that w ill be published to the public, the following should be considered :

• Information included in the report should be reviewed to determine whether it
increases the cybersecurity risks to the organization and/or nation. This assessment
is important as information provided, which typically is not available in the public
forum, c an assist adversaries in accelerating a cyber -attack. The auditor should
engage the policy and operational cybersecurity specialists to discuss the associated
risks. The following are strategies for reducing the risks associated ;
o Information that is not pu blicly available should not be included in the report.
o Names of systems, tools, staff and teams should be removed if possible.
o Security information such as security monitoring processes, security
configurations, and vulnerabilities should not be included i n the report, and
more importantly, connected to systems or organizations ;
• The materiality of the information can be used to exclude information from the report.
If security related information, such as vulnerabilities, can be excluded without
affecting t he conclusions then that information should be removed. The auditor will
need to balance accountability and transparency against security risks ; and
• The auditor can aim to aggregate and generalize security information to reduce the
risks of security contro ls being attributed to specific systems.


3 Auditing national cybersecurity and data protection

To develop national cybersecurity and data protection audits, this document provides
relevant information and reference on the following themes:

• National Cybersecurity Strategy and Governance ;
• Cybersecurity evaluation to critical processes and resources ; and
• National Agencies / government entities Cybersecurity Assessment .
This is in order to provide the reader with a general overview on the differ ent ways
Cybersecurity and Data Protection has been approached globally speaking.
3.1 National Cybersecurity Strategy and Governance
3.1.1 Importance of Up -To -Date National Cybersecurity Strategies

A national cybersecurity strategy (NCSS) is often the key cornerst one of organizational
measures at national cybersecurity level. According to the ITU Guide to developing a
national cybersecurity strategy, a national cybersecurity strategy is a comprehensive
framework or strategy which must be developed, implemented, and executed in a multi –
stakeholder approach, that tackles coordinated action for prevention, preparation, response,
and incident recovery on the part of government authorities, the private sector and civil

More and more countries are developing NCSS to manage cybersecurity in a more
structured way. Such strategies can confer several benefits, including countries convening
relevant stakeholders, clarifying national priorities, and planning cybersecurity capac ity

Any overall strategy that seeks to address National Cyber security (NCS) will most likely
need to orientate itself according to various parameters: what is the purpose of the strategy?
who is the intended audience? These are standard quest ions for any national security
strategy and are independent of the cybersecurity domain. But what is inherent to the
cybersecurity topic are more specific questions: firstly, where is the strategy directed at,
what is its actual purpose, who are the stakeh olders? Secondly, how is the cybersecurity
domain segmented, and how are the different interpretations of NCS understood? And
thirdly, how does this all relate to the wider well -being of the nation?

For these last three questions the N orth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Cooperative
Cyber Defen ce Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) suggests three conceptual tools to
help focus strategic deliberations: respectively, they are termed the ‘three dimensions’, the
‘five mandates’, and the ‘fiv e dilemmas’ of national cybersecurity. Together they provide for
a comprehensive view of the topic. Not all NCSS will want to provide equal weight to the
different aspects of national cybersecurity described in their Manual. Therefore, these tools
are inte nded to provide an overview of what aspects can be considered, rather than a
checklist of what should be taken into account. (of what should be done.)


3.1.2 The Three Dimensions: Governmental, National, and International

Any approach to a NCS strategy needs to consider the ‘three dimensions’ of activity: the
governmental, the national (or societal) and the international.

3.1.3 The Five Mandates of National Cyber security

Within the general context of discussing national cybersecurity, it is important to keep in
mi nd that this is not one single subject area. Rather, it is possible to split the issue of NCS
into five distinct perspectives or ‘mandates’, each of which could be addressed by different
government departments. This split is not an ideal state, but it is a reality due to the
complexity and depth of cybersecurity as a whole: Military Cyber, Counter Cyber Crime,
Intelligence and Counterintelligence , Critical Infrastructure Protection , National Crisis
Management and Cyber Diplomacy and Internet Governance .

3.1.4 The Five Dilemmas of National Cybersecurity

National cybersecurity is a tool to reach a desired state of affairs (desired situation, not an
end). Most nations define a strategic goal of a safe and secure environment within which
they can achieve full econo mic potential and protect citizens from various cyber and non –
cyber related risks, both domestic and foreign. To achieve this, NCS must deal with its own,
overarching set of ‘national cybersecurity dilemmas’. In international relations theory, the
traditio nal ‘security dilemma’ states that both a country’s security strength and its weakness
can create unfavorable reactions in their adversaries. The NCS Dilemmas are, however,
different: both a strong and a weak NCS posture can have economic and social costs:

1. Stimulate the Economy vs. Improve National Security.
2. Infrastructure Modernization vs. Critical Infrastructure Protection.
3. Private Sector vs. Public Sector.
4. Data Protection vs. Information Sharing.
5. Freedom of Expression vs. Political Stability.

For more information:
Document Link
National Cyber security Framework
An evaluation framework for
Cyber security Strategies -evaluation –
framework -for -cyber -security -strategies
A National Cybersecurity Strategy
88834d9e8c08f28d0b9dda5b/a -national -cyber -security –
strategy -skr. -201617213


3.1.5 Cybersecurity and data protection governance and oversight

Organization Country Document Link
United States
Office (GAO)
Cybersecurity Clarity of
Leadership Urgently Needed to
Fully Implement the National
Strategy -20 –

The GAO reviewed the contents of the National Cyber Strategy and its associated
Implementation Plan dated June 2019. They obtained the content of the Implementation
Plan through observation at the request of the NSC not to submit a copy of the plan. From
the observation, they transcribed, among other things, the title of each activity and the
leadership and support of the federal agencies. They also tra nscribed sections of each
element containing data related to the desirable features of a national strategy developed
from our previous GAO work, such as new resources and authorities, targets and deadlines,
and designation of levels. They did not transcrib e all the information contained in the Plan
of Implementation.

They then evaluated the National Cyber Strategy and the transcribed elements of the
Implementation Plan to determine whether they collectively possessed the desirable
characteristics of a nati onal strategy developed from their prior work by identifying possible
indicative statements in the documents.


Characteristic Definition Required
Information Analysis
scope, and
Addresses why the strategy was
produced, the scope of its
coverage, and the process by
which it was developed.
Applicable policies,
strategies, and laws
to confirm the key
federal entities with
roles and
responsibilities in
supporting the
• “This plan was created t o…”
• “Purpose” statement
• Executive summary
definition and
Addresses the national problems
and threats the strategy is directed
towards and entails a risk
assessment that includes an
analysis of threats, and
vulnerabilities of, critical assets
and operations.
A risk assessment
that includes an
analysis of threats ,
and vulnerabilities of
critical assets and
• Risk assessment, including
an analysis of threats and
• Issue areas
activities, and
Addresses what the strategy is
trying to achieve, steps to achieve
those results, as well as the
priorities, milestones, and
performance measures to gauge
Priorities, milestones ,
and performance
measures to gauge
• Milestones for achieving
• Performance measures for
tracking progress
• Reporting requirements
• Life cycle/time frames
• Standards
and risk
Addresses what the strategy will
cost, the sources and types of
resources and investments
needed, and where resources and
investments should be targeted
Cost analysis.
Specific risks

• Analysis of the cost of
planned activities
• Estimates of how activities
will be funded in the future


Characteristic Definition Required
Information Analysis
based on balancing risk reductions
with costs. • Source and type of resources
needed to carry out the goals
and objectives
• Assessment of the specific
risks and resources needed
to mitigate them
Addresses who will be
implementing the strategy, what
their roles will be compared to
others, and mechanisms for them
to coordinate their efforts.
Relevant federal
officials’ interviews to
confirm the key
federal entities.
Cybersecurity –
related roles and
responsibilities for
federal entity.
• Delegation of responsibilities
• Oversight responsibilities
• Clarity for individual
agencies’ response options
to specific incidents
• Coordination groups
• “XX is responsible for…”/ “XX
• “XX will do ___ by doing…”
Integration and
Addresses how a national strategy
relates to the goals, objectives,
and activities of other strategies,
and to subordinate levels of
government and their plans to
implement the strategy.
Applicable policies,
strategies, and laws. • How strategy is linked to or
superseded by other
documents and strategies
• Describ es progress made
since previous strategies or
• Why activities in this plan are
prioritized differently than in
other plans
• Crosswalk(s)

3.1.6 Regulations by country
Country Legislation, Best Practices and Certifications in Cybersecurity
framework in the
European Union
Directive NIS
The main standard approved by the EU on cybersecurity is
Directive 2016/1148 of security of networks and information
systems (NIS Directive).
https://eur – –
Cybersecurity law (EU Cybersecurity Act)
This Cybersecurity law was approved by the EU in March
2019. It aims to renew and strengthen the EU Cybersecurity
Agency (ENISA) and establish a cybersecurity certification
framework throughout the EU for products, services, and
https://eur – –
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a
regulatory framework for data protection and privacy that
came into force on May 25, 2018. -is-
gdpr /#:~:text=The%20G
e%20EU .


Country Legislation, Best Practices and Certifications in Cybersecurity
Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)
DORA, as an EU regulation, it aims to establish a
comprehensive and cross -sector digital operational resilience
framework with rules for all regulated financial institutions.
It is an important step in creating a harmonized regulatory
framework for the operational resilience of financial services
in EU law. For the first time, it will bring together the rules that
address the risk of ICT in finance in a single piece of
The rules are intended to cover a wide range of financial
services entities and the requirements are applied
proportionately based on the size and business profile of the
https://eur – –

Country Legislation, Best Practices and Certifications in Cybersecurity
Federal Laws Cyber security Information Exchange Act (CISA)
Its goal is to improve cybersecurity in the United States
through the enhanced sharing of cybersecurity threat
information and for other purposes.
The law allows the exchange of internet traffic
information between the US government and technology
and manufacturing companies. The bill was introduced
in the United States Senate on July 10, 2014 and was
approved October 27, 2015.
blication/cybersecurity –
information -sharing -act –
2015 -procedures -and –

Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014
This law was signed into law on December 18, 2014. It
provides an ongoing, voluntary public -private
partnership to improve cybersecurity and strengthen
cybersecurity research and development, workforce
development, and education and public awareness and
the preparation.
/content/pkg/COMPS –
12455/pdf/COMPS –
Federal Exchange Data Breach Notification Act of
This law requires a health insurance exchange to notify
everyone whose personal information is known to have
been obtained or accessed because of a breach of the
security of any system. Notification must be made as
soon as possible but no later than 60 days after
discovery of the violation.
ov/bill/114th –
congress/house -bill/555
National Cybersecurity Breakthrough Protection Act
of 2015
This act amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to
allow the Department o f Homeland Security
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) to include
tribal governments, information sharing, and analysis
centers, and private entities among its non -federal
ov/bill/114th –
congress/house –
Spain Code of
Law in Spain


Russia Cybersecurity
Federal Law N ° 187 -FZ on the security of critical
information infrastructure of the Russian Federation
The law, approved in July 2017, establishes the basic
principles for ensuring the security of critical information
infrastruct ure, the related powers of Russian state
bodies, as well as the rights, obligations and
responsibilities of people who own facilities with
information infrastructure.
critical information, communication providers and
information systems that provide intera ction.
The law requires the implementation of protection
measures, assigning the category of protection
(according to the statutes) and then registering with the
Federal Service for Technical and Export Control, which
will oversee supervision in this field .
https://cis –

Federal Law Nº 152 -FZ about personal data
The Personal Data Law, passed in July 2006, covers
almost all aspects of data protection.
Unlike European legislation, the Personal Data Law
does not distinguish between data controllers and data
Therefore, any person or entity that works with personal
data is considered an operator of personal data and is
governed by the regulation of the Personal Data Law.

Federal Law No. 149 -FZ on Information, Information
Technologies, and Information Protection (the
Information Law)
This law has been substantially strengthened with some
additional amendments and affects the Russian internet
and telecommunications industries.
Mobile operators will need to store the recordings of all
phone calls and the content of all text messages for a
period of s ix months, which carries huge costs.
ocs.eng/ 149.pdf
Portugal Legislations and
Resolution of the Council of Ministers (RCM) No
36/2015, of June 12
Resolution of the Council of Ministers (RCM) No
36/2015, of June 12
The National Cyberspace Security Strategy is
committed to deepening networks and information
security, as a way to ensure the protection and defense
of critical infrastructures and vital i nformation services,
and promote the free, safe and efficient use of
cyberspace by all citizens, companies and public and
private entities
42 .pdf
Order No. 1195/2018, of February 2
The Superior Council for Cyberspace Security (CSSC)
is the Prime Minister’s specific consultation body for
matters relating to cyberspace security.
Law No.46/2018, of August 13,
Establishes the legal framework for cyberspace security,
transposing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 , of the European
Parliament and of the Council, of 6 July 2016, on
Ensuring a common level of security for networks and
information systems across the European Union.

The Cyberspace Security Legal Regime applies to
Public Administration entities, critical infrastructure
operators, essential service operators, digital service
providers, as well as any other entities that use
/docs/regime -jurdico –
da -segurana -do –


information networks and systems, namely, with in the
scope of voluntary incident reporting.
Resolution of the Council of Ministers (RCM) No
92/2019, of June 5
National Cyberspace Security Strategy (ENSC) 2019 –
2023 is based on three strategic objectives: maximizing
resilience, promoting innovation and generating and
securing resources. The implications and needs
associated with each of the strategic objectives make it
possible to define a general and specific orientation,
translated into six intervention axes, which form
concrete lines of action aimed at reinforcing the national
strategic potential in cyberspace
Decree -Law No. 65/2021, of July 30
The Cyberspace Security Legal Regime applies to
Public Administration entities, critical infrastructure
operators, essential service operators, digital service
providers, as well as any other entities that use
information networks and systems, namely, within the
scope of voluntary incident reporting.
/docs/decreto -lei-65 –
Decree -Law Nº. 20/2022, of January 20
Approves procedures for the identification, designation,
protection and resilience of national and European
critical infrastructures.
Regulation No 183/2022, of 21 February;
Configures technical instructions for communication
between entities and the National Cybersecurity Center.

Country Legislation, Best Practices and Certifications in Cybersecurity
New York Cybersecurity Laws
This regulation is designed to promote the protection of
customer information, as well as the information technology
systems of regulated entities.
This regulation requires each company to assess its specific
risk profile and design a program that robustly addresses its

California Consumer Privacy Act
The California Consumer Privacy Act, or CCPA, is a state -level
law that requires, among other things, that companies notify
users of the intent to monetize their data and provide them with
a direct means to opt out of such monetization

3.1.7 Cybersecurity strategy and program evaluation
Organizational measures examine the governance and coordination mechanisms within
countries that address cybersecurity. Organizational measures include ensuring that
cybersecurity is sustained at the highest level of the executive and assigning relevant roles
and responsibilities to various national entities and making them accountable for the national
cybers ecurity posture.

The lack of adequate organizational measures can contribute to a lack of clear
responsibilities and accountability in the national cybersecurity governance, and it can
prevent effective intragovernmental and inter -sector coordination.


3.1.8 National Cybersecurity Maturity Evaluation Models

Overview of analyzed maturity models
Model Name Institution
Source Purpose Target Nb of
Nb of
Representation Link
Model for
Capacity Centre
University of
Increase the scale and
effectiveness of
cybersecurity capacity –
building internationally
Countries 5
with local
organization to
fine -tune the
model before
applying it to
the national
Five -section
2016 Cybersecurity Report
n/cybersecurity -are -we -ready –
latin -america -and -caribbean
2020 Cybersecurity Report:
n/2020 -cybersecurity -report –
risks -progress -and -the -way –
forward -in-latin -america -and –
the -caribbean
The Global
Index (GCI)
on Union (ITU)
To review the
cybersecurity commitment
and situation and help
countries identify areas for
improvement in the field of
Countries N/A 5
Self –
assessment Ranking table
Global Cybersecurity Index
(GCI) 2018:
u-d/opb/str/D -STR -GCI.01 –
2018 -PDF -E.pdf
Global Cybersecurity Index
(GCI) 2020:
u-d/opb/str/D -STR -GCI.01 –
2021 -PDF -E.pdf
The European
Union Agency for
The framework aims at
providing Member States
with a self -assessment of
their level of maturity by
assessing their NCSS
objectives, that will help
them enhance and build
cybersecurity capabilities
both at strategic and at
operational level.
Member States 5 4
Self –
assessment Ranking table
National Capabilities
Assessment Framework:
ublications/national –
capabilities -assessment –


Comparison of Attributes/ Dimensions

Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for
The Global Cybersecurity Index
National Capabilities Assessment Framework
Five dimensions divided into several factors
themselves including multiple aspects and
indicators (Figure 4)
Five pillars including several indicators The National Capabilities Assessment Framework covers 17
strategic objectives and is structured around four main clusters.
i. Devising cybersecurity policy and strategy;
ii. Encouraging responsible cybersecurity
culture within society.
iii. Developing cybersecurity knowledge;
iv. Creating effective legal and regulatory
frameworks; and
v. Controlling risks through standards,
organizations, and technologies.
i. Legal;
ii. Technical;
iii. Organizational;
iv. Capacity -building;
v. Cooperation.
i. Cybersecurity governance and standards
• Develop a national cyber contingency plan
• Establish baseline security measures
• Secure digital identity and build trust in digital public services
ii. Capacity -building and awareness
• Organize cybersecurity exercises
• Establish an incident response capability
• Raise user awareness
• Strengthen training and educational programs
• Foster R&D
• Prov ide incentives for the private sector to invest in security
• Improve the cybersecurity of the supply chain
iii. Legal and regulatory
• Protect critical information infrastructure, OES, and DSP
• Address cyber crime
• Establish incident reporting mechanisms
• Reinforce privacy and data protection
• Establish a public -private partnership
• Institutionalize cooperation between public agencies
• Engage in international cooperation


3.2 Cybersecurity evaluation to critical processes and resources

The present introduces the different Techniques to assess and perform risk analysis for
critical infrastructure and National Resiliency / Disaster Recovery considering some study
cases and audits reports from SAI audits of critical processes and resources.

3.2.1 Critical Infrastructures

One important activity in the development of a National Cybersecurity Strategy (NC SS) is to
identify and classify Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and Critical Information

Nevertheless, nowadays there is no standard methodology to help nations address this
foundational identification task, for that reason we present some examples and guidelines
that are used in auditing of critical national infrastructure .

It should be noted that this chapter only provides a brief introduction and points out the
importance of having a classification of the critical infrastructures of the countries, which was
identified through the study of the audit reports of the different SAIs, however , for greater
detail of the execution of audits by sectors to critical infrastructures go to chapter 4
“Cybersecurity and Data Protection by Sectors”.

Critical National Infrastructures (CNI) describes broadly physical and virtual infrastructure
that suppo rts virtual nation functions as well as national goals and aspirations, so the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
the nation’s security , economic stability, public health or safety, or any combination
of these factors .

Equally , Critical Information Infrastructures (CII) is an important component of Critical
National Infrastructure, especially to the extent different national functions rely on
information and communications technology (ICT) for their ope ration. Common Factors to Consider while Preparing for Conducting CNI/CII Assessments
As it has been shown among different countries, identifying CNI/CII is fundamentally a
matter of classifying the risk exposure that information and communications techno logies
introduce to assets and functions that are important to national goals, objectives, and
aspirations. The key to determinate risk is designing an effective formal, inclusive, and
rigorous governance structure and process to enumerate, define, and val idate important
cyber risk exposures, in particular developing a consensus on the potential harms of critical
infrastructure disruptions to secur E the economy and citizens.

Most conventional approaches for dealing with cyber risks are focused on cyber -thr eats,
attack types and vectors rather than on impact (e.g., economic, national security, societal)
caused by cyber means. Nowadays, attempts to identify and measure the harm caused by
inadequate cybersecurity of critical infrastructures have used various m eans to express the


severity of the attack. However, a threat -based approach too often encompasses a linear,
cause -and -effect analysis of cyber threats. Therefore, a more holistic approach to assessing
the effect of cyber threats and attacks requires the i nclusion of the concept of cyber harm,
which describes the negative impact upon an entity, whether individual, organizational, or

Thus, based on the analysis of the different SAI’s audit reports the most important principles
for effectively form alizing and assess ing a CNI/CII includes:

• To identify if there is a mandate or policy from national leadership.
• Technical and policy competence and clear and transparent policy development
• Leveraging existing laws and organizations and public -private relationships to
facilitate critical infrastructure identification.
• Developing consensus on CNI/CII identification criteria and policies that are created
by active participation of all partners in whatever mechanisms nations use.
• Considerations of t he degree of national harm created by elements of risk – threat,
vulnerability, likelihood, and predictability as well as the potential cascading
consequences of prolonged disruptions.
• Use of international frameworks or standards to assess CNI/CII.
• Assess risks using the method of benchmark, in order to identify certain risk
assessment policy and methodological approaches that other countries have used
successfully, th is is focused on nations that have similar national goals and
circumstances. CNI / CII Pol icy Guidance
Based on the foregoing, national strategies may integrate or update existing CNI/CII policy
guidance, legal frameworks, or national programs that address critical infrastructure. When
developing policies and strategies to identify CNI / CII, policymakers may consider the
following perspective.

• Transactional Perspective:
The policymakers should understand related international policies, norms, and best
practices. They also should explore the CNI/CII identification approaches of other
nations to better situate and contextualize the effects of relevant practices, additionally,
they should understand the implications of CNI/CII across sectors and borders
considering dependences and interdependencies.

• Societal Perspective:
A key par t is to address the potential societal harms associated with the disruption of
essential functions supported by critical infrastructure (e.g., healthcare, financial
services, food supply). Thinking in terms of how critical service disruptions could impact
citizen may uncover perspectives on risks associated with services that have not
traditionally been prioritized.


Categories for CNI/CII strategies :
This document contains a compilation of the audits carried out by different Supreme Audit
Institutions ( SAI’s), among which they were classified into three main types as General
Auditing of Critical National Infrastructure, Semi -Specific Auditing of Critical National
Infrastructure and Specific Auditing of Critical National Infrastructure by Sectors, which a re
defined as follows:

• General CNI/CII audit with generic procedures, except for Canada, which has a
specialized guideline for critical infrastructures.
• Semi -Specific CNI/CII audit with general guidelines.
• Specific CNI/CII audit with specialized guidelin es for critical infrastructures.
In any case, it is important to mention that this chapter only makes a brief explanation of the
categories identified, as well as the case studies based on the audit reports of different SAIs,
however, the details of the ex ecution and the elements that must be consider executing an
audit of critical infrastructures for each sector is described in chapter 4, so for further details
go to that chapter

3.2.2 General Auditing of Critical National Infrastructure
As it’s mentioned, nati ons may apply different frames of references as they work to identify
CNI/CII. Many of them, initially oriented CNI/CII efforts around discrete sectors such as the
financial service, energy, or transportation sectors, to identify and address critical ICT
assets. This approach has been modified over time to focus more on identifying critical
national functions which is intended to facilitate cross -sector views of risk vs. within single
sectors and helps account for the possibilities of cascading effects when critical assets are
And that is why, many countries perform a general audit of Critical National Infrastructure,
focused on the impact of cybersecurity attacks in the society.

Therefore, we present the use cases based on different SAIs report s, that perform a general
audit of critical infrastructure, to encourage cybersecurity audits to create an applicable and
locally adoptable guides that helps countries to develop and implement processes for
CNI/CII identification, as follows: Canada
The goal of the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure is to build a safer, more secure
and more resilient Canada. To this end, the National Strategy advances more coherent and
complementary actions among federal, provincial, and territorial initiatives and among the
ten critical infrastructures sectors listed below:

• Energy and utilities
• Information and communication technology
• Finance
• Health
• Food
• Water
• Transportation


• Safety
• Government
• Manufacturing
The National Strategy suppor ts the principle that critical infrastructure roles and activities
should be carried out in a responsible manner at all levels of society in Canada.
Responsibilities for critical infrastructure in Canada are shared by federal, provincial, and
territorial g overnments, local authorities and critical infrastructure owners and operators –
who bear the primary responsibility for protecting their assets and services.

The National Strategy is based on the recognition that enhancing the resiliency of critical
infr astructure can be achieved through the appropriate combination of security measures to
address intentional and accidental incidents, business continuity practices to deal with
disruptions and ensure the continuation of essential services, and emergency man agement
planning to ensure adequate response procedures are in place to deal with unforeseen
disruptions and natural disasters.

The purpose of the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure (the Strategy) is to strengthen
the resiliency of cr itical infrastructure in Canada. The Strategy works toward this goal by
setting the direction for enhancing the resiliency of critical infrastructure against current and
emerging hazards.

Scope and Methodology

To be effective, the National Strategy must be implemented in partnership among all levels
of government and critical infrastructure sectors. Critical infrastructure owners and operators
have the expertise and information that governments need to develop c omprehensive
emergency management plans. In turn, governments will share relevant information in a
timely manner, respecting existing federal, provincial, and territorial legislation and policies,
to help owners and operators assess risk and identify best practices. This partnership
approach recognizes that more resilient critical infrastructure helps foster an environment
that stimulates economic growth, attracts, and retains business, and creates employment
opportunities. Governments bring value to the pa rtnership through activities such as:
• providing owners and operators with timely, accurate, and useful information on risks
and threats;
• ensuring industry is engaged as early as possible in the development of risk
management activities and emergency manage ment plans; and
• working with industry to develop and prioritize key activities for each sector.
The National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure represents the first milestone in the road
ahead. It identifies a clear set of goals and objectives and outlines the guiding principles that
will underpin our efforts to strengthen the resiliency of critical infrastructure. The National
Strategy establishes a framework for cooperation in which governments and owners and
operators can work together to prevent , mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from
disruptions of critical infrastructure and thereby safeguard the foundations of our country
and way of life.


Frameworks and Guides

• An Emergency Management Framework for Canada -mngmnt -frmwrk/mrgnc –
mngmnt -frmwrk -eng.pdf
• National Cross Sector Forum 2021 -2023 Action Plan for Critical Infra structure -ctn -pln -crtcl -nfrstrctr/index –
• National Cybersecurity Strategy -cbr -scrt -strtg/index -en.aspx


Federal, provincial, and territorial governments will work together to monitor the
implementation of the Strategy and support the assessment of programs and activities
targeted at enhancing the resiliency of critical infrastructure in Canada. It is expected that
the collaborative approach established in the Strategy will r emain evergreen and strengthen
coherency of action among all levels of government and critical infrastructure sectors.
The Strategy is to be read in conjunction with the Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, which
will be reviewed three years after laun ch and every five years thereafter. Turkey
With the 2016 -2019 National e -Government Strategy and Action Plan, the Turkish Court of
Accounts (TCA) bears responsibility for “Ensuring the Efficiency of Audit for e -Government
Projects in Public Sector”. In this context, the TCA has created an audit mod el for e –
Government projects, prepared a draft audit guideline concordant with the model and carried
out a pilot audit on GocNet e -Government Project, which is executed by Ministry of Interior,
Directorate General of Migration Management.


The objective of the audit is based on the following:

• Examination and evaluation of IT controls, which are set to ensure confidentiality,
integrity, availability, reliability, efficiency, effectiveness, and compliance to
legislation of the project itself and the IT environment in which it is executed;
• Contributing to the Institution by identifying the problems that may prevent the
successful completion of the project and by providing recommendations for taking
the necessary precautions ; and
• Providing informati on about the project to its stakeholders through reporting.

Scope and Methodology

In the audit, the methodology determined in the e-Government Projects Audit Guideline
(Draft) was followed. The Guide has been prepared based on COBIT (Control Objectives


for Information and Related Technologies), ITAF (Information Technology Assurance
Framework), PMBOK (Project Management Body of Knowledge).

In this context, the following risk -based audit approach was followed:

1. Identifying the risks related to the Projec t itself and the IT environment where it is
executed ;
2. Determination of the controls that can minimize these risks ;
3. Examination of whether these controls are established by the Institution, and if so,
whether they are functioning effectively ;
4. Evaluation of the control weaknesses identified ; and
5. Reporting of material control weaknesses to the stakeholders.
Besides the project and the application, itself, the corporate IT environment, and
infrastructure (servers, network, databases) and the web (and mobile) st ructures where the
application was put into service have been subject to audit and specific audit tests.

The audit team has determined the modules to be tested according to the following criteria:

• Materiality (The impact of the application on the activities of the Institution and
financial statements, etc.) ;
• Criticality (Integrity, confidentiality, and availability of corporate information, etc.),
• Complexity (Number of users, transaction volume, etc.) ;
• Technological Infrastructure (Operating system , software development environment,
database, etc.);
• Control Environment (Support personnel, documentation, errors, etc.) ; and
• Audit Resources (Time and human resources constraints, etc.).
Frameworks and Guides

GocNet e -Government Project Information Sy stems Audit -gocnet -e-government -project –
information –
Control Objectives for Information and Relate d Technologies (COBIT)

Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) -guide –


As a result of the audit , detected control weaknesses have been negotiated with the audited
Institution and explained in the Report in such way to include the relevant control area, the
associated audit criteria, the level of risk, the relevant legislation and/or standards, the
possible effects, actions taken by the auditee and the recommendations thereof.
A follow -up audit will be planned and conducted separately.

36 Korea
Due to the rapid development of Information Communication Technology (ICT), the
dependency on information comm unication in both the private and public sectors have been

However, instances of cyber terror, such as the paralysis of Nonghyup computer networks
(April 2011) and EBS personal information leakage of nearly 4 million users (May 2012)
continuously occur, proving that the security of the nation and society are at risk. Based on
the foregoing it is necessary to conduct audits in ICT systems including cr itical


The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI) inspected the overall conditions of cyber
safety management of the Ministry of Security and Public Administration (MOSPA) and 35
other organizations, to relieve the societ al anxiety and concern derived from cases of
information leakage and cyber terror.

Scope and Methodology

The methodology determined by the group was into two steps.
• Personal Information Protection and Management
One of the significant roles of the MOSPA is to supervise and guide the local autonomous
entities that implement tasks, which also includes the task of the resident registration search.
Regulations state that personal information can only be used within the range of what is
necessary .
• Establishme nt of Infrastructure for Information Protection
The MOSPA had developed the Disaster Recovery System (DRS) measure against system
breakdowns resulting from natural disaster or acts of cyber terror.

Nevertheless, the MOSPA has not been checking on its regu lar operations, nor been
performing simulation training, as prescribed by regulation, Military Manpower
Administration’s (MMA) DRS in 2010.

Frameworks and Guides

Audit on Information Security and Cybersecurity Management in Public Organizations
IT Application and Improvement focusing on the Government Information Systems


The BAI recommended the MOSPA to regularly monitor the implementation of tasks of the
local autonomous entities regarding resident registration and personal information.
According to the BAI, the government officials responsible for perusing resident regis tration


information for personal use are ordered to receive disciplinary action. Additionally, the
malfunctions detected in the MMA’s DRS should be analyzed and compensated for.

Finally, the BAI has notified six organizations, including the Korean Local I nformation
Research and Development Institute (KLID), to regularly monitor PCs and to meticulously
secure the management of equipment and labor provided to service companies. Australia
In June 2014, ANAO Audit Report No. 50 2013 –14, Cyber Attacks: 1. Secu ring Agencies
ICT Systems was tabled in Parliament. The report examined seven Australian Government
entities implementation of the mandatory strategies in the Australian Government
Information Security Manual (Top Four mitigation strategies). The Top Four mitigation
strategies are: application whitelisting, patching applications, patching operating systems
and minimizing administrative privileges.

The audit found that none of the seven entities were compliant with the Top Four mitigation
strategies and no ne were expected to achieve compliance by the Australian Government’s
target date of 30 June 2014.

In this context, the seven entities were: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Customs
and Border Protection Service, Australian Financial Security A uthority, Australian Taxation
Office, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Human Services, and IP


The objective for this audit was to assess whether the Australian Taxation Office, the
Department of Human Services, and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection
are compliant with the Top Four mitigation strategies in the Australian Government
Information Security Manual.

To form a conclusion against the audit objective, the ANAO adopted the following high -level
assessment criteria:

• Do the entities comply with the Top Four mitigation strategies ? and
• Are entities cyber resilient?
Scope and Methodology

This audit is a follow -up audit of the ANAO Performance Audit Report No. 50 2013 –14 that
was table in June 2014.

The audit objective was to assess whether three of the seven entities assessed in the first
audit had achieved compliance with the Top Four mitigation strategies. The three entities
• Australian Taxation Office ;
• Department of Human Services; and


• Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
These three major Australian Government entities are significant users of technology:

• The Department of Human Services relies on its ICT systems to process $172 billion
in payments annually;
• Through its electronic lodgment systems, the Australian Taxation Office collects over
$440 billion tax revenue per year; and
• The Department of Immigration and Border Protection electronically processes
around seven million visas annually and inspects and ex amines over two million air
and sea cargo imports and exports.

All three entities collect, store, and use data, including national security data and personally
identifiable information that can be used to identify, contact, or locate an individual such as
date of birth, bank account details, driver’s license number, tax file number and biometric

The ANAO reviewed records and interviewed relevant personnel from each entity and
conducted assessment and tests of controls that underpin the compliance o f the Top Four
mitigation strategies for each entity.

Frameworks and Guides

• Protective Security Policy Framework
• AGD’s PSPF, Security planning a nd risk management policy, -planning -risk –
• ISO 31000:2018, Risk management – Guidelines


Recommendation 1.

The ANAO recommends that entities periodically assess their cybersecurity activities to
provide assurance that: they are accurately aligned with the outcomes of the Top Four
mitigation strategies and entities’ own ICT security objectives; and that they can report on
them accurately. This applies regardless of whether cybersecurity activities are insourced
or outsourced.

• Dep artment of Human Services’ response: Agreed.
• Australian Taxation Office’s response: Agreed.
• Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s response: Agreed.


Recommendation 2.

The ANAO recommends that entities improve their governance arrangements, by:

1. Asserting cybersecurity as a priority within the context of their entity -wide strategic
2. Ensuring appropriate executive oversight of cybersecurity;
3. Implementing a collective approach to cybersecurity risk management; and
4. Conducting regular reviews and assessments of their governance arrangements to
ensure its effectiveness. Brazil

The Brazilian Federal Court of Audits reviewed the level of awareness and knowledge
through the application of surveys and audits, re commending that the user has a technical
profile and ideally, be the manager or be assigned to a unit responsible for managing the
organization’s information technology (IT) security. As part of the guideline developed, it was
clarified that the criteria u sed to support the preparation of this questionnaire were freely
adapted from the professional judgment of the TCU team of auditors on version 8 of the
framework developed by the Center for Internet Security (CIS). The questionnaire addresses
four of the e ighteen critical cyber controls listed in this version as followed:

• Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets ;
• Inventory and Control of Software Assets ;
• Continues Vulnerability Management ; and
• Security Awareness and Skills Training .

Scope and Methodolo gy

The audit was conducted by the Federal Audit Court, specifically, by the Information
Technology Infrastructure Secretariat (SETIC), which takes care of IT infrastructure,
customer service and process and project management. The study involved document
analysis, interviews, and researcher observations.

The documental analysis covered the court’s regulations and publications, as well as the
report of an organizational climate survey conducted in 2012. Organizational climate refers
to people’s perception of the work environment. The report provided an overview of the
organizational culture of the IT area of this court but did not identify facilitators and obstacles
to IT governance.

Frameworks and Guides

• CIS Critical Security Controls, version 8.
• ABNT NBR ISO/lEC 20000 -22008,
• ABNT NBR ISO/lEC 27002:2013
• Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) v3


• GSI/PR 3/2021, Chapter 11 (Mapping of information assets)
• Standard 8/IN01/DSIC/GSIPR (Guidelines for managing incidents in computer
networks – TIR management – in the bodies and entities of the Federal Public
Administration (APF)
• Risk Management Manual of the Federal Court of Auditors (TCU, 2018)

The Brazilian Federal Court of Audits expects for the researched agencies to use the
assessment results to boost their risks management strengthening process. Among the
benefits that organizations may acquire, the following stand out: greater possibility of
achieving their goals; improvement of operational effectiveness and efficacy; govern ance
improvement; greater confidence of the organization´s stakeholders; optimization on loss
and incident management prevention; better information for planning and decision -making
process; complying with the applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

3.2.3 Semi -Specific Auditing of Critical National Infrastructure
We identified that United Kingdom conducts its critical infrastructure audits specifically, with
general guidelines to examine CNI and CII identification and mitigation programs, as shown
below: United Kingdom
The future of the UK’s security and prosperity rests on digital foundations. The challenge of
our generation is to build a flourishing digital society that is both resilient to cyber threats
and equipped with the knowledge and capabilities r equired to maximize opportunities and
manage risks.

We are critically dependent on the internet. However, it is inherently insecure and there will
always be attempts to exploit weaknesses to launch cyber -attacks. This threat cannot be
eliminated complet ely, but the risk can be greatly reduced to a level that allows society to
continue to prosper, and benefit from the huge opportunities that digital technology brings.

Our strategy refers to the protection of information systems (hardware, software, and
associated infrastructure), the data on them, and the services they provide, from
unauthorized access, harm, or misuse. This includes harm caused intentionally by the
operator of the system, or accidentally, as a result of failing to follow security procedu res.


The strategy is intended to shape the Government’s policy, while also offering a coherent
and compelling vision to share with the public and private sector, civil society, academia,
and the wider population

Scope and Methodology

The audit considered the effectiveness of centre of government in defining government’s
strategic approach to protecting information across critical infrastructure in central


government departments (the departments) (Part One); the centre’s performance in
protecting information, including managing specif ic projects (Part Two); and departments’
performance in protecting their information (Part Three).

The center consists of various teams within the Cabinet Office as well as other organizations
such as CESG and the National Cybersecurity Centre. The centr al government departments
consist of the 17 largest departments of state, although we have included other bodies where
the evidence allows, as many of these issues are not unique to central government.7

Frameworks and Guides

National Cybersecurity Strate gy 2022 -cyber -strategy -2022
Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF)


Protecting information while re -designing public services and introducing new technology to
support them is a complex challenge for government. To achieve this, the centre of
government requires dep artments to risk manage their information, but few departments
have the skills and expertise to achieve this by themselves. How successful government is
in dealing with this challenge will therefore continue to depend on effective support from the
Cabinet Office and other bodies at the center of government.
The Cabinet Office is taking action to improve its support for departments but needs to set
out how this will be delivered in practice. To reach a point where it is clearly and effectively
coordinating activity across government, the Cabinet Office must further streamline the roles
and responsibilities of the organizations involved, deliver its own centrally managed projects
cost -effectively and clearly communicate how its various policy, principles and guidance
documents can be of most use to departments.

3.2.4 Specific Auditing of Critical National Infrastructure by Sectors
On the other hand, we identified that USA conducts its critical infrastructure audits across
specific sectors, and it has developed ind ividual guidelines for each sector, aiming to
understand and examine CNI and CII identification and mitigation programs in every sector.

Please note that this section only points out the importance of having a classification of
critical infrastructures an d addresses in a general way the analysis that an audit of critical
infrastructures entails without going into the detail of an evaluation by sectors that must be
carried out in the Execution of audits of critical infrastructures by sector. United States of America
Our nation’s critical infrastructure refers to systems and assets, whether physical or virtual
are so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on the nation ’s security, economic stability, public health or
safety, or any combination of these factors. Critical infrastructure includes, among other


things, banking and financing institutions, telecommunications networks, and energy
production and transmission fac ilities, most of which are owned and operated by the private

Threats to the systems supporting critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. These
cyber -based assets are susceptible to unintentional and intentional threats. Unintentional,
or non -adversarial threat sources include equipment failures, software coding errors, or the
accidental actions of employees. They also include natural disasters and the failure of other
critical infrastructures since the sectors are often interdependent.

The framework is to provide a flexible and risk -based approach for entities within the nation’s
sixteen critical infrastructure sectors to protect their vital assets from cyber -based threats.

It should be noted that for the identification of the 16 critical factors indicated by the United
States of America, an evaluation must be carried out that contemplates the risks and the
possible impact in case of these risks materializing, in the life and governance of the country,
hence the importance of havin g a classification of the country’s sectors, industries and
critical infrastructures.

Likewise, the detail of the 16 sectors defined by the United States of America, as well as the
considerations that must be taken into account in the execution of critica l infrastructure
audits by sector, is presented in chapter 4 “Considerations of cybersecurity and data
protection by sector”.


The objectives of our review are to determine the extent to which the National Institute of
Standards and Technology ( NIST) facilitated the development of voluntary standards and
procedures to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure, and federal agencies promote the
standards and procedures to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure.
Scope and Methodology

To determine how NIST facilitated the development of voluntary standards and procedures
for critical infrastructure, we reviewed and analyzed the actions taken by NIST to develop
its Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. In addition, we analyzed
Executive Order 13636, issued in February 2013, and the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act
of 2014, enacted in December 2014, to identify key NIST responsibilities for developing a
cybersecurity framework. We analyzed documents and performed intervi ews with NIST
officials to assess its collaborative efforts with industry stakeholders in soliciting input in the
development of the framework, including workshops it hosted and the website it set up to
disseminate updates on the framework. Specifically, w e reviewed documentation and videos
of the six workshops hosted by NIST intended to obtain industry, academic, and government
representative feedback in the development of the framework, in addition to NIST’s two
requests for information to the public for input on cybersecurity standards and


methodologies. We also analyzed the resulting framework to assess whether NIST had
fulfilled its responsibilities under law. 10

Additionally, to address this objective, we conducted a web -based survey of individuals who
provided written comments with contact information in response to a NIST request for
information notice or registered for at least one of the workshops hosted by NIST to develop
the framework. There were 2,082 individuals in the population that we targete d, and to make
the survey as inclusive as possible we sent the survey request to all of them. The
questionnaire included questions about the effectiveness of NIST’s collaborative efforts in
fulfilling requirements to develop the framework using an open and public comment process.
To minimize errors arising from differences in how questions might be interpreted and to
reduce variability in responses that should be qualitatively the same, we conducted pretests
with critical infrastructure representatives over the telephone. Based on feedback from these
pretests, we revised the questionnaire to improve the clarity of the questions. An
independent survey specialist within GAO also reviewed a draft of the questionnaire prior to
its administration.

After completi ng the pretests, we administered the survey to the NIST workshop attendees
and request for information respondents on August 10, 2015, notifying them that our online
questionnaire would be activated within a couple of days. On August 18, 2015, we sent a
se cond e -mail message to these individuals, informing them that the questionnaire was
available online and providing them with unique passwords and usernames. We collected
responses through August 24, 2015. We were able to obtain 252 completed questionnaires ,
a 12 percent response rate, in the time available for survey fieldwork. Because we do not
know if the answers that nonrespondents would have given would materially differ from
those that did respond, our results can only represent the views of those who did respond.
Their views are not generalizable to the registrant and respondent population. To address
our second objective, we reviewed and analyzed actions and documentation related to
promoting the framework by the nine sector specific agencies (SSAs) r esponsible for the 16
critical infrastructure sectors established in Presidential Policy Directive -21, including the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and NIST. For DHS, we analyzed agency
documentation and the website of its Critical Infrastructure C yber Community (C3) Voluntary
Program to identify the framework promotional guidance and tools provided to the critical
infrastructure sectors. Also, we analyzed the metrics and information being used by the DHS
C3 Voluntary Program to determine if DHS cou ld measure the effectiveness of its activities
and programs to promote the adoption of the framework. We also interviewed DHS officials
on their activities related to the promotion of the framework, including their current and future
promotional efforts. T o analyze the promotional efforts by the nine SSAs, we analyzed
relevant documentation and interviewed agency officials representing each of the SSAs. We
specifically asked each of the SSAs whether promoting the framework was a priority in their
draft 2015 sector -specific plans and whether they had decided to develop framework
implementation guidance in accordance with Executive Order 13636. See table 5 for the
sectors and SSAs included in our review.
10 -press -office/2013/02/12/executive -order -improving -critical –
infrastructur e-cybersecurity -12455/pdf/COMPS -12455.pdf



Frameworks and Guides

Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 16, 2018


Most sectors ha ve taken action to facilitate adoption of the NIST cybersecurity framework
within their respective sectors. By developing implementation guidance and aligning existing
sector information resources with framework principles, most SSAs and SCCs have
establis hed a set of tools that entities could leverage to adopt the framework. However, none
of the SSAs have assessed the extent to which their entities have adopted the framework.
Without an accurate assessment of framework adoption within each sector, federal entities,
SSAs, and SCCs lack a comprehensive understanding of the current adoption level within
critical infrastructure sectors. As such, SSAs are unable to tailor their guidance to effectively
encourage use of the framework to sector stakeholders.

Recom mendations

We are making nine recommendations to sector -specific agencies in our review for them to
develop methods to determine the level and type of framework adoption across their
respective sectors. Specifically:

• The Secretary of Agriculture, in coo peration with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, should take steps to consult with respective sector partner(s), such as the
SCC, DHS and NIST, as appropriate, to develop methods for determining the level
and type of framework adoption by entities across their respective sector ;
• The Secretary of Defense should take steps to consult with respective sector
partner(s), such as the SCC, DHS and NIST, as appropriate, to develop methods for
determining the level and type of framework adoption by entities across their
respective sector ;
• The Secretary of Energy should take steps to consult with respective sector
partner(s), such as the SCC, DHS and NIST, as appropriate, to develop methods for
determining the level and type of framework adoption by e ntities across their
respective sector ; and
• The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency should take steps to
consult with respective sector partner(s), such as the SCC, DHS and NIST, as
appropriate, to develop methods for determining the level and type of framework
adoption by entities across their respective sector.
Guidelines by sector



https:/ / –
framework -implementation -guide -2015 -508.pdf

Commercial Facilities Sector –
facilities -framework -implementation -guide -2015 -508.pdf

Communications Sector

Critical Manufacturing Sector –
manufacturing -framework -implementation -guide -2015 -508.pdf

Dams Sector -framework –
implementation -guide -2015 -508.pdf

Defense Industrial Sector -171r1.pdf

Emergency Services Sector -framework –
implementation -guide -2015 -508.pdf

Energy Sector urity
%20Framework%20Implementation%20Guidance_FINAL_01 -05 -15.pdf

Financial Services Sector -10/R -SAT_0.pdf /pdf/cybersecurity/FFIEC_CAT_App_B_Map_to_NIST_CSF_June_20

Healthcare and Public Health Sector -csf -to-hipaa -security -rule -crosswalk -02 -22 –
2016 -final.pdf

Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector –
framework -implementation -guide -2015 -50 8.pdf

Transportation Systems Sector
https://www.ics -content/uploads/2020/08/guidelines -on -cyber -security –
onboard -shi ps -min.pdf

46 -cybersecurity -framework –
implementation -guide -2016 -508v2_0.pdf –
FAC/Documents/Maritime_BLT_CSF.pdf?ver=2017 -07 -19 -070544 -223

Water and Wastewater Systems S ector
19.pdf?ver=2019 -09 -09 -111949 -960
sibility.pdf?ver=2018 -12 -05 -123319 -013

3.2.5 National Resilience / Disaster Recovery
Organizational resilience is important to assure users and managers that the expected level
of service will be provided. Outages are also often unavoidable driving factors in
organizations; therefore, preparation is key to be able to continue operations while protecting
people, assets, and the organization’s reputation; employing process resiliency tactics helps
organizations to address these issues and limit the impacts.

It is worth to mention that the importance of having a resilience strategy and a disaster
recovery plan lies in the fact that in the event of a contingency, the operational continuity of
the critical systems and infrastructures of each country must be protected and ensured.

Likewise, these audits plans were classified into two main types:

• General disaster recovery audit with generic procedures ; and
• Disaster recovery audit with specialized guidelines by functions. General Disaster Recovery Australia

Information and communications technology (ICT) systems are critical for the operations of
government agencies. Agencies depend on them to:

• Deliver public services — including essential services — to the community.
• Efficiently and effectively manage operations.
• Fulfill their statutory obli gations.

To make sure their systems remain available and continue to operate reliably, agencies
must be able to recover and restore them in the event of a disruption — such as an event that
interrupts access to premises, to the data that systems rely on, or to the systems
themselves. Further, agencies need to
be able to recover and restore their systems within a time frame that reflects the business –
critical nature of each system.

ICT disaster recovery is the process for recovering systems following a majo r disruption.
ICT disaster recovery planning forms part of an agency’s wider business continuity strategy.


Managing disaster recovery risk presents special challenges. The likelihood of a major
disaster or significant disruption is generally low, often re mote — but the consequences of a
system failure that cannot be restored could be significant or even catastrophic.

Without effective disaster recovery capability, agencies risk:

• Extended disruption or inability to deliver public services that depend on sys tems ;
• Inability to recover systems and restore lost data ;
• Subsequent financial loss to themselves and the Victorian economy ; and
• Reputational damage, including loss of community confidence in the effective
delivery of government services.

Agencies can red uce the likelihood of disruption events; however, this approach can require
significant investment compared to the direct costs of responding to a disruption when it
occurs. It can therefore be challenging for agencies to determine the balance between
focu sing on preventative actions and planning to manage the consequences of possible

Scope and Methodology

In this audit, we examined disaster recovery at Victoria Police and four departments that
provide essential government services — the Department of Economic Development, Jobs,
Transport and Resources (DEDJTR), the Department of Environment, Land, Water and
Planning (DELWP), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the
Department of Justice and Regulation (DJR).

We assessed whether their ICT disaster recovery processes are likely to be effective in the
event of a disruption.

Frameworks and Guides

• Protective Security Policy Framework
• AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines -1:v1:en
• ISO/IEC 27031:2011 Guidelines for information and communication technology
readiness for business continuity .html
• ICT Disaster Recovery Planning -12/20171129 -ICT -Disaster –


At present, none of the agencies we audited have sufficient assurance that they can recover
and restore all their critical systems to meet business requirements in the event of a


They do not have sufficient and necessary processes to identify, plan and recover their
systems following a disruption. Compounding this is the relatively high number of obsolete
ICT systems all agencies are still using to deliver some of their critical business functions.

This both increases the likelihood of disrupti ons though hardware and software failure or
external attack and makes recovery more difficult and costly. These circumstances place
critical business functions and the continued delivery of public services at an unacceptably
high risk should a disruption o ccurs.

Agencies are beginning to fully understand the importance of comprehensively identifying
and prioritizing their business functions, maintaining the ICT systems that support these
functions, and establishing recovery arrangements to maintain continuity of service.

They need to significantly improv e and develop well -resourced and established processes
that fully account for and can efficiently recover the critical business functions of agencies
following a disruption.


We recommend to the Departments of Economic Development, Jobs, T ransport and
Resources, Environment, Land, Water and Planning, Health and Human Services, Justice
and Regulation and Victoria Police to:

1. Appoint a team of suitably qualified and experienced professionals to form a collaborative
disaster recovery workin g group to:

• Provide advice and technical support ;
• Share lessons learnt based on disaster recovery tests and exercises ;
• Coordinate disaster recovery requirements for resources shared between agencies.
• Identify, develop, implement, and manage initiatives th at may impact multiple
agencies ; and
• Coordinate funding requests to ensure critical investments and requirements are

2. Perform a gap analysis on their disaster recovery requirements and resource capabilities
to determine the extent of the c apability investment that will be required.

3. Develop disaster recovery plans for the systems that support critical business functions
and test these plans according to the disaster recovery test program.

4. Provide advice and training to staff on:

• New ly developed frameworks, policies, standards and procedures to increase
awareness and adoption as needed ; and
• Specific disaster recovery systems .

5. Establish system obsolescence management processes to:


• Identify and manage systems at risk of becoming obsolete, those that will soon have
insufficient support or those that will be difficult to manage when they become
obsolete ;
• Enable strategic planning, life -cycle optimization, and the development of long -term
business cases for system life -cycl e support; and
• Provide executive with information to allow risk -based investment decisions to be

Finally, it was not identified that there is an agency that oversees coordination and activation
of the national disaster recovery plan. Disaster Recovery by Functions United States of America
We identified that USA conducts its Disaster Recovery Plans audits across specific sectors,
and it has developed individual guide lines for each sector.

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) is responsible for implementing the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF)
and working in partnership with states as they play a lead role in the recovery process. As
shown in the figure below, FEMA coordinates federal recovery stakeholders using six
Recovery Support Functions — structures through which federal coordinating agencies
provide assistance to state and local communities, before and after a disaster. FEMA’s
regional offices facilitate pre -disaster recovery planning at the state and local level, promote
state adoption of NDRF principles into state pre -disaster recovery plans, and coordinate
collaboration between federal, state, local, and tribal governments. Under the NDRF, states
have primary responsibility for managing recovery in their communities, including developing
pre -disaster recovery plans based on the principles and structures in the NDRF.

The National Disaster Recovery Fram ework (NDRF) enables effective recovery support to
disaster -impacted states, tribes, territorial and local jurisdictions. It provides a flexible
structure that enables disaster recovery managers to operate in a unified and collaborative
manner. The NDRF fo cuses on how best to restore, redevelop, and revitalize the health,
social, economic, natural, and environmental fabric of the community and build a more
resilient nation.

The NDRF is a first step toward achieving a shared understanding and a common, inte grated
perspective in order to achieve unity of effort and to build a more resilient nation.


It is important to point out that the importance of considering, within the scope of the audits
of disaster recovery plans, the operational continuity of criti cal infrastructures, lies in the fact
that natural events (storms, floods, fires, etc.), as well as cyber -attacks could stop the
substantive operations of the essential sectors of each country Factors to Consider for Disaster Recovery by Functions audits.
In order to conduct a disaster recovery audit by functions, the US government analyses the

• Risk should be identified and managed in a coordinated way within the critical
infrastructure community to enable effective resource a llocation ;
• Critical infrastructure partnerships can greatly improve understanding of evolving risk
to both cyber and physical systems and assets and can offer data and perspectives
from various stakeholders ;
• Understanding and addressing risks from cross -se ctor dependencies and
interdependencies is essential to enhancing overall critical infrastructure security and
resilience ;
• Gaining knowledge of and reducing infrastructure risk requires information sharing
across all levels of the critical infrastructure c ommunity ;
• A partnership approach, involving public and private stakeholders, recognizes the
unique perspectives and comparative advantages of the diverse critical infrastructure
community. For example, Emergency Support Function 14 of the National Response
Framework supports the coordination of cross -sector operations, including
stabilization of key supply chains and Community Lifelines, among infrastructure
owners and operators, businesses, and their government partners ;


• Regional, state, and local partners hips are crucial to developing shared perspectives
on gaps and improvement actions ;
• Critical infrastructure transcends national boundaries, requiring bilateral, regional,
and international collaboration; capacity building; mutual assistance; and other
coop erative agreements. For example, the “Canada -U.S. Action Plan for Critical
Infrastructure” sets the foundation for cross -border critical infrastructure security and
resilience efforts between the two countries ; and
• Security and resilience should be conside red during the design of infrastructure

In this context, chapter 4 addresses in greater depth the elements and methodologies to be
considered to carry out an audit of cybersecurity and data protection by sectors, so for more
details please consu lt chapter 4 “Cybersecurity and Data Protection by Sectors”.
3.3 Auditing National Cyber Incident Response
3.3.1 The role of government entities in charge of cyber incident response.
This section identifies the role of government entities in charge of cyber incident response
(CSIRT), specifying CSIRT evaluation schemes, identifying the elements of review to
understand the nature, scope, and operation of a cybersecurity incident handling service, as
well as explaining the SIM3 model for the evaluation of the maturity level of a CSIRT which
reviews the competence achieved, either in the execution of specific functions or in a set of
functions or services.

3.3.2 Entities Responsible for National Cybersecurity.
There are government cybersecurity agencies specialized in the in vestigations of the
different computer crimes or frauds committed in cyberspace, their fundamental task is to
combat computer crimes and frauds that are carried out through the internet, all this through
legal processes established in the laws of each coun try; The computerized or cybernetic
police forces receive complaints through social networks or telephone calls, which are
essential to begin investigations in relation to crimes.

These police organizations dedicated to the computer world pursue and preve nt bank fraud,
identity theft, cyberbullying or online bullying, child pornography, identity theft through
different social networks and hacks that result in loss or kidnapping of information. Their
functions are diverse. Among them, they are in charge of fighting virtual terrorism, carrying
out cyber patrolling to avoid computer crimes or fraud against computer systems and/or
banking institutions, carrying out the necessary investigations to pursue cases involving
computer crimes, cyberbullying and child p rostitution through the use of the internet as a
means of contact, and are also in charge of analyzing and identifying the different types of
computer crimes and scams carried out through the internet.

The cybernetic police operate throughout cyberspace c arrying out antihacker cyber patrols,
with the help of specialized equipment (computers) and personnel for its execution. Units
specializing in cybercrime seek to protect all citizens who use the network, monitoring
through the so -called CSIRT/CERT, protec ting citizens social network accounts, responding


to calls for complaints or scams, or any other computer crime. These teams (CSIRT/CERT)
are of vital importance since they are the ones in charge of coordinating the different
organizations that oversee ide ntifying and responding to cyber incidents.

It is important to underline that each country has a different political structure, culture,
geography, legal framework, and resources, and thus, the guidelines are not intended to be
imposed, but rather must be adapted to the local conditions of each country.

3.3.3 CERT/CSIRT functions
• CERT – Computer Emergency Response Teams. It is a trademark registered by
Carnegie Mellon University in the USA and for a response team to be called in this
way, it must meet ce rtain requirements and evaluations by this university ; and
• CSIRT – Computer Security Incident Response Teams, is a concept that may be
more commonly used by incident response teams. Associations such as FIRST, TF –
CSIRT or CSIRT validate, based on their ski lls and references, who should be
considered as such.

The services provided by CSIRTs can be divided into three areas:

• Preventive/Proactive: in charge of alert monitoring, security audits, vulnerability
scanning, malicious artifact scanning, technology m onitoring, artifact analysis, and
forensic analysis ;
• Reactive: they manage an incident, from analysis, to response actions, support, and
coordination, which implies post -mortem analysis, on -site assistance, response to
vulnerabilities, response to maliciou s artifacts, etc. ; and
• Added value, help manage the organization’s security by conducting risk
assessments, participating in business continuity plans, disaster recovery, as well as
participating in awareness programs.

All CSIRTs work differently dependin g on the entities they provide protection to. However,
in general terms, most of these groups have an attack team, which is responsible for
studying the behavior of cybercriminals and the main attack vectors, and a defense team,
whose objective is to analy ze the traffic of the networks to be alert under the presence of a
computer eventuality. Additionally, these teams have great challenges such as sharing
information, adding synergies with other CSIRTs to be able to share information in forums
(such as APCE RT or FIRST) and being able to offer an effective and rapid response to any
threat to the most critical information or the interruption of services and/or business.

National CSIRTs respond to state/national level incidents and typically monitor and addres s
incidents on government networks and serve as information security coordinators for the
private sector or other sectors and institutions. The role and target community of a national
CSIRT varies depending on their roles and the existence of other respons e centers; in this
sense, it is very common that there are several CSIRTs with specific functions (for example,
a critical infrastructure CSIRT) as part of the community served by a national CSIRT.


3.3.4 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and Computer Sec urity Incident
Response Team (CSIRT)

Distinctions are made between CERT and CSIRT: A CERT is conceived as a study center
and a place where methods and procedures are established to improve incident response
teams; a CSIRT team are those responsible for re sponding to incidents 11 and it should be
clarified that there are only two CERTs defined as such in the world: one is the CERT/CC
(CERT Coordination Center), which is part of the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie
Mellon University, in Pennsylvania , United States, and the other is US -CERT, the response
team of the US Department of Homeland Security. In all other countries around the world,
cybersecurity teams are called Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs),
which upon obtaining certifi cation offered by Carnegie Mellon University can include in its
name is the acronym CERT 12.

These teams can be public or private, the main types of CSIRT are listed below 13:

• National CSIRTs: In addition to serving a defined community, a country’s CSIRT
typically assumes the role of national incident response coordinator and is the
contact for national and international incidents ;
• Government CSIRTs: Government CSIRTs serve State institutions to ensure that
the government’s IT infrastructur e and the services offered to citizens have adequate
levels of security ;
• Military Sector CSIRT: These CSIRTs provide services to the military institutions of
a country. Their activities are generally limited to the defense or offensive cyber
capabilities o f a nation ; and
• Critical Infrastructure CSIRT: In some cases, there are CSIRTs determined
specifically for the protection of information assets and critical infrastructure of the
nation, regardless of whether it is operated by the public or private sector, or its
The TF -CSIRT site is the main European CERT’s forum in which the most outstanding
CERT’s in the world collaborate, innovate and share information, you can see lists of
11 SIC – Spanish magazine specializing in information security and the security of technological information and
communication systems used in organisations. SIC number 142 – November 2020 – CSIRTs: At the foot of the
Canyon: -Press -Release -20201118.pdf ; ENISA – Document
setting -up-guide/@@download/fullReport ; ENISA – How to setup up CSIRT and SOC/ good practice guide: -to-set -up -csirt -and -soc/at_download/fullReport . 12 CERT & CSIRT : -es-un-Equipo -de-Respuesta -ante –
Emergencias -Informaticas -CERT -20180122 -0009.html . 13 General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS), 20006 United States of America – April
2016 – Good practices to establish a national CSIRT: –
%20Best%20Practices%20CSIRT.pdf ; ENISA – Document HOW TO CREATE A CSIRT STEP BY STEP
WP2006/5.1 : -setting -up -guide/@@download/fullReport ; ENISA – How to setup
up CSIRT and SOC/ good practice guide: -to-set -up-csirt -and –
soc/at_download/fullReport .


accredited teams (194), certified (31) and lists (185) of the European U nion at the date of
this document (January 2022), both from the public and private sectors.

3.3.5 Guide for cybersecurity CSIRT Assessment guide for cybersecurity CSIRT

The first analysis that must be carried out consists of knowing if cybersecurity agencies a nd
their operating entities (CSIRT/CERT) have been established at the national level, by
answering the following questions:
Operating entities:

1. Is there a competent national authority for information security and cybersecurity
2. Is there an incident reporting platform to collect cybersecurity incident data?
3. Are national cybersecurity exercises carried out?
4. Is there a National Incident Management Structure (NIMS) to respond to
cybersecurity incidents?
5. Is there a National Computer Emergency Res ponse Team (CERT)? o Computer
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)?
6. In what year was the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) established?

In a study made by the European Union (EU) 14, it is shown a board with the complete
description of the estate of the actual cybersecurity frames and its capacities for each
member. The report considers five main areas of cybersecurity politics of each state of EU:

• Legal foundations of cybersecurity ;
• Operating Entities ;
• Public -private partnerships ; and
• Education.

Incident response capabilities must be established in the Operating Entities, managing the
most critical and significant events that threaten the confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of significant information networks nationally and sys tems. Computer Emergency Response
Teams (CERT) and Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT) can play a
crucial role in improving cyber resiliency

Once verified the existence of those cybersecurity entities can be taken into consideration
the foll owing two evaluations:

• A pillar -based evaluation in which the bases, mission, vision, and objectives are
reviewed, up to its operation, analyzing it as ad hoc with its purpose to achieve the
benefits expected by the organization; also reviews compliance with legal and
institutional frameworks and that their practices adhere to existing and approved
standards ; and
14 BSA The Software Alliance – Document EU Cybersecurity Panel. A path to a secure European cyberspace: .


• On the other hand, there is the assessment of the maturity level of a CSIRT, which
focuses on comparing the current level of the organization wi th respect to how its
functions are governed, documented, performed, and measured and allows
understanding the improvement actions to be addressed. Pillar -based assessment for cybersecurity agencies

The objective of the pillar -based evaluation guide for a CSIRT is to analyze its creation and
implementation, including the different criteria that were considered to define its constitution,
mission, vision, scope, budget, types of services, organizationa l model, availability, legal
and institutional frameworks, applicable regulations and their organizational structure; it also
contains an analysis of human resources requirements, both in terms of skills and conduct,
and of continuing training, which are c onsidered necessary. On the other hand, the review
considers the physical infrastructure, which includes physical installations, hardware,
software, network, and technical tools that allow its operation; and finally, the policies,
procedures, standards are analyzed 15.

The Pillars refer to 5 paragraphs where criteria are integrated that must be evaluated, these
ranging from its constitution to its operation 16:

• Bases: The root (business plan, constitution, legal restrictions, etc.) ;
• Organization: Attributio ns (mandate and related organizational structures) ;
• Human: Human resources (team personnel, structure, experience, code of conduct
and training options) ;
• Tools: Physical and logical infrastructure for the work (everything required to carry
out the tasks of the agency) ; and
• Processes: Policies, procedures, processes, standards (for agency operation,
incidents, media, etc.).
Table 1: Evaluation by mainstay
15 SIC – Spanish magazine specializing in information security and the security of technological information and
communication systems used in organisations. SIC number 142 – November 2020 – CSIRTs: At the foot of the
Canyon: -Press -Release -20201118.pdf ; CCN – Guide to creating
a CERT/CSIRT – CCN -STIC -810: https://www.ccn -ccn -stic/800 -guia -esquema -nacional -de –
seguridad/520 -ccn -stic -810 -guia -de -creacion -de -cert -s/file.html ; Cybersecurity Agency of Catalonia – Tools and
software packages: https://csirt : General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS),
20006 United States of America – April 2016 – Good practices to establish a national CSIRT: –
%20Best%20Practices%20CSIRT.pdf . 16 ThaiCERT (Thailand Computer Emergency Respons e Team a member of ETDA) – Translation into Spanish
CSIRT CEDIA – Document Establishing a CSIRT: –
content/uploads/2020/ 08/Estableciendo.un_.CSIRT_.v1.3 -es_EC.pdf .
¿What is evaluated? Description Required Information Elements to be evaluated Reference guides and good practices
To carry out the evaluation of the BASES pillar, we must consider the mission, objectives, vision, values, priorities, stakeholders, legal
1. Identification document of the interested parties. 2. Stakeholder management plan. 3. Constitution document of the national CSIRT. a. Mission and vision.
Agency definition 1. Scopes of action of the CSIRTs. 2. Concerned parties 3. Mission, Objective, and vision
Organization of American Stat es (OAS) Good practices to establish a national CSIRT. – %20Best%20Practices%20CSIRT.pdf National Cryptologic Center (CCN) CCN -CERT


Pillar: Foundations The foundations of the CSIRT
alignment, its target community, its institutional and legal framework and finally the range and nature of services i t offers. This review should identify why the CSIRT exists, what it does, to whom it performs services, what values motivate it, the route that the organization will take in the long term, which is the constitution of the CSIRT (as an independent (privat e) as a unit within a public or private organization, and finally the legal framework governing it at country level imposing restrictions to protect the CSIRT and its operations.
b. Institutional framework. c. Legal framework. 4. Minutes of planning and implementation meetings. 5. Lists of participants in the different activities. 6. Emails exchanged with experts. 7. Definition of target community. 8. List of services with their description.
4. Alignment with the legal framework. Constitution of the agency 5. Institutional fram ework. 6. Legal framework. Review of applicable laws and regulations, at least the following: a. Cybersecurity b. Security of the information c. Personal data protection. d. Critical infrastructures. e. Telecommunications service providers (data retention, user protection) f. International cooperation. 7. Business plan (budget, implementation plan). Reach 8. Target community (government, private sector, or both). 9. Services (reactive services, proactive services, and value – added services).
CCN -STIC -810 CERT/CSIRT creation guide. https://www.ccn -ccn – stic/800 -guia -esquema -nacional -de- seguridad/520 -ccn -stic -810 -guia-de- creacion -de-cert -s/file.html Thailand Computer Emergency Response Team a member of ETDA Establishing a CSIRT p- content/uploads/2020/08/Estableciendo.un_.CSIRT_.v1.3 -es_EC.pdf Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) How to create a CSIRT step by step WP2006/5.1
s/how -to-set -up-csirt -and -soc/
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) How to setup up CSIRT and SOC/ good practice guide -to-set -up-csirt -and – soc/at_download/fullReport LACNIC/ AMPARO Project Computer security incident management manual. – content/themes/warpnew/docs/manual_basico_sp.pdf Pillar: Organization CSIRT’s Organization
To carry out the evaluation of the ORGA NIZATION pillar, the organizational model (mandate) must be considered, which indicates the position and attributions of the CSIRT within the target organization or community, as well as its relationship with other internal and external organizational stru ctures.
1. CSIRT organizational model 2. Participation reports in cybersecurity forums.
Organizational model 1. Structure definition. 2. Information exchange. a. Registration to forums and information communities on cybersecurity.
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Organizational Models for Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT) https://p cacfd441dd0863b34ead3ca598a5f4d35de.pdf?_ga=2.43035820.888637854.1645152937 -1222354997.1645152937 Organization of American States (OAS) Good practices to establish a national CSIRT. – %20Best%20Practices%20CSIRT.pdf LACNIC/ AMPARO Project Basic IT security incident management manual.

57 – content/themes/warpnew/docs/manual_basico_sp.pdf Pillar: Human CSIRT human resources
The evaluation of the HUMAN pillar refers to who carries out the services required by the target community, for this it is necessary to evaluate the organizational structure of the CSIRT, including functions and responsibilities of each member. Likewise, the evaluation must consider the knowledge, experience, and necessary skills of said resources and the training options that are required to potentiate their functions in the CSIRT, and finally, the review must include the conduct guidelines established for the CSIRT.
1. Organizational structure. 2. Hired human resources . 3. Applicable code of conduct . 4. Cyberse curity training calendar .
Organization and HR 1. Organizational structures (number of areas and resources). 2. Roles and responsibilities. Selection of human resources: Training requirements: 3. Certifications and technical training (in basic areas: general cyb ersecurity, incident response, cybersecurity and malware and forensic analysis, etc.). 4. Personal skills (resistance to stress, analytical skills, flexibility, creativity, etc.). Conduct guidelines 5. Code of conduct
Book: Organizational Structure By Mario Javier Brume Gonzalez -ORGANIZACIONAL.pdf Organization of American States (OAS) Good practices to establish a national CSIRT. – %20Best%20Practices%20CSIRT.pdf Official College of Psychologists Technical guide and good practices in recruitment and selection of personnel (R&S).
smadrid/docs/guia_tecnica_b uenas_pra
Trusted Introducer CSIRT Code of Practice https://www.trusted – LACNIC/ AMPARO Project Basic IT security incident management manual. – content/themes/warpnew/docs/manual_basico_sp.pdf Pillar: Tools CSIRT Tools and Facilities
The evaluation of the TOOLS pillar includes everything that is required to carry out the tasks of the agency, from the basic general services that correspond to the equipment of the physical space and services, the physical access methods, and the IT equipment, to the tools or specia lized software packages for the operation.
1. Location of physical facilities, rental contracts, etc. 2. Technological infrastructure and the respective support contracts. 3. Network diagrams. 4. Hardware relation. 5. Software Relationship. 6. Storage platform. 7. Backup schedule 8. Classification of information.
Facilities and IT infrastructure 1. Physical facilities 2. Basic network design 3. IT infrastructure and tools, at least the following: a. Institutional web server b. Institutional mail server. c. Intranet server. d. File server. e. Server backups. f. DNS server. g. Event monitoring, collection, and correlation server. h. Recording and monitoring of incidents. IT infrastructure design and network architecture 4. Confidential information protection 5. Information storage.
Book: The C ontrol Center Design Book By: Armando Gonzalez Lefler en erales%20para%20data%20center&f=false, páginas 52 -59. Organization of American States (OAS) Good practices to establish a national CSIRT. – %20Best%20Practices%20CSIRT.pdf International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) ISO 27001 ISO 22301 Cybersecurity Agency of Catalonia Toolkit to provide the first steps to new incident management equipment. Tools such as: open -source threat intelligence platforms, incident management information, operational inte lligence,


incident response platforms, forensic network analysis, records management, etc. https://csirt Pillar: Process The processes governing the CSIRT
The evaluation of the PROCESSES pillar must include the analysis of the organization’s policies and procedures because they are essential to govern its operation and the activities of the response center, and these should ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the information and resources, as well as the quality of its services.
1. Operations manual with policies and procedures. 2. Formalized security policies and procedures. 3. Documentation of implemented standards. 4. Technical memories of implementation of configur ations. 5. Formalized operating procedures. 6. Formalized security guidelines. 7. Description of specific incidents. 8. Definition of information exchange formats. 9. General cybersecurity guides. 10. Statistical reports.
Politics and procedures 1. Definition of policies and procedures. 2. Formalization and application of operational policies and procedures of at least the following policies: a) Information classification. b) Data protection. c) Withholding information. d) Iinformation destruction . e) Disclosure of information. f) Access to information. g) Appropriate use of agency systems. h) Definition of security incidents and event policy . i) Incident management. j) Cooperation. k) Use of internet. l) Incident reporting. m) Agency communication. n) Training and coaching. o) Security of personal equipment. p) Network security. q) Use of email. r) Use of mobile devices. s) Telecommunications equipment security. t) Backups . u) Segregation of duties. v) Change control and passwords. 3. Standards and good practices implemented for the operation of the CSIRT : a. Incident management procedures. b. Incident prevention and management procedures. c. Incident detection procedure. d. Specific incident process . e. Procedures for integrating forensic techniques in incident response . f. Incident response procedures. g. Guidelines for the collection and archiving of evidence .
Politics: Organization Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) Standards: Nacional Institu te of Standards and Technology (NIST) of USA. SP 800 -61 SP 800 -83 SP 800 -86 IETF/RFCS (INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE) RFC 2350 RFC 3227 RFC 3067 RFC 4765 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) ISO 27035 ISO/IEC 29147 ISO 27001 ISO 27032 ENISA Standards and tools for exchange and processing of actionable information ds-and -tools -for-exchange – and -processing -of-actionable – information


Source: Created by ASF.
3.3.6 Assessing the maturity level of a CSIRT

The objective of the maturity level evaluation is to analyze how well a CISRT team governs,
documents, performs, and measu res its function. This analysis compares the level where
the CISRT is currently, which allows organizations to visualize the information and consider
it as a baseline to detect existing gaps, carry out in -depth reviews, issue opinions and take
actions focu sed on continuous improvements. SIM3 Model

Maturity is a level of competency achieved either in the execution of specific functions or in
a set of functions or services. The maturity of an organization will be determined by the
scope, the quality of established policies and documentation and the ability to execute an
established process, the level of advancement in knowledge, skills and competence
measured against a defined reference model.

The Security Incident Management Maturity Model (SIM3) issue d by the Open CSIRT
Foundation and used since 2009 17, is based on three basic elements for its evaluation:

1) Maturity parameters, 44 parameters: 10 in organization, 7 in human, 10 in tools and 17 in
2) Quadrants of maturity: Organization, Human, Tools and Processes.
3) Maturity Levels:

0 = unavailable / undefined / unaware ;
1 = implicit (known/considered but not written, “between the ears”) ;
2 = explicit, internal (written but not formalized in any way) ;
3 = explicit, formali zed with the authorization of the head of the CSIRT (sealed or
published) ;and
4 = explicit, audited by the authority of the levels of government above the head of
the CSIRT (subject to control/audit/enforcement process) .

Maturity models such as SIM3 can b e used by new CSIRTs as well as well -established
CSIRTs around the world. Using this maturity model, they can ensure that they have a
17 SIM 3 Model:
chrome –
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html? –
h. Intrusion detection message exchange formats. i. Procedures for disclosure of information.


clearly defined framework for achieving their goals. Considering that SIM3 is designed
incorporating extensive experience from incident response professionals, organizations
should consider it as a baseline and focus on continuous improvements.

This model is used as a support in the certification frame of Trusted Introducer (which
belongs to the European Union, Austria, Braz il, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom,
United States, etc.,) and its being adopted by several organizations members of FIRST (to
which belongs 99 countries such as United States, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Peru,
Argentina The Russian Federation, China, Switzerland, Norway, Germany, Spain, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, and Australia, etc.,) and the Nippon CSIRT Association -NCA in Japan
with (440 members) 18.

The re is a self -assessment survey offered by ENISA (European Union Cybersecurity
Agency), based on the SIM3 maturity model, that can be done online which evaluates the
44 parameters divided into four categories: organization, processes, tools, and human
resou rces of an incident response team. These will determine a basic, intermediate, or
advanced level of maturity 19.

Figure 1.

18 ThaiCERT (T hailand Computer Emergency Response Team a member of ETDA) – Translation into Spanish
CSIRT CEDIA – Document Establishing a CSIRT: https://csirt.ce –
content/uploads/2020/08/Estableciendo.un_.CSIRT_.v1.3 -es_EC.pdf ; FIRST – Map of forum members: ; Members of NCA – Japan: . 19 ENISA – Self -assessment SIM3 model: https:// -in-europe/csirt –
capabilities/csirt -maturity/csirt -survey .


Parameters to cover according to maturity levels

Through the following link the assessment can be done: -in-europe/csirt -capabilities/csirt -maturi ty/csirt –
Parameters of the SIM3 model 20
Parameter Number of
ID What is checked?

10 O-1, O -2, O -3, O -4, O -5,
O-7, O -8, O -9, O -10 y O –
Mandate, distribution, authority, responsibility,
service description, service level description,
incident classification, participation in existing
CSIRT frameworks, organizational framework,
and security policy .

7 H-1, H -2, H -3, H -4, H -5,
H-6 y H -7.
Code of Conduct/Practice/Ethics, Personal
Resilience, Skill/Skill Set Description, Internal
Training/Training, Technical Training (External),
Communication Training (External), and External
Networks. Tools

10 T-1, T -2, T -3, T -4, T -5,
T-6, T -7
T-8, T -9 y T -10
IT resource list, source list, consolidated email
system, incident tracking system, rugged phone,
resilient email, resilient internet access, incident
prevention toolkit, Incident detection toolkit and
incident resolution toolkit.


P-1, P -2, P -3, P -4, P -5,
P-6, P-7
P-8, P -9, P -10
P-11, P -12, P -13, P -14,
P-16 y P -17.
Scaling to governance level, scaling to press
function, scaling to legal function, incident
prevention process, incident detection process,
incident resolution process, specific incident
processes, audit/feedback process, emergency
accessibility process, i nternet presence best
practices, question about the secure information
management process, information sources
process, disclosure process, reporting process,
statistics process, collection process and peer -to-
peer process.

20 Source provided by SAI Mexico.


4 Considerations of cybersecur ity and data protection by sector

Critical infrastructure sectors contain vital systems, which if incapacitated, could debilitate
or destabilize a nation’s security, economy, public health or safety. Critical infrastructure can
include, among others, bank ing and financial institutions, telecommunications networks, and
energy production and transmission facilities.

Figure 1 describes examples of critical infrastructure sectors that may be in place. Although
these sectors were defined for the United States , other nations’ critical infrastructure sectors
may be similar or vary depending on the assets nations consider essential for the functions
of their society and economy.

Figure 1. Examples of critical infrastructure sectors.

However, increasing cyber threats to these critical infrastructure sectors represent a
significant security challenge. Specifically, malicious actors have intruded and extracted
information from, and disrupted the networks of, government agencies and major critical
infrastructure companies throughout the world. Recent incidents illustrate the pressing need
to strengthen critical infrastructure cybersecurity. For example, attacks targeted health care
and essential services in the United States and United Kin gdom during the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID -19) pandemic, and the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia


noted an increase in ransomware incidents against critical infrastructure organizations
starting in 2021. 21

Organizations within a country’s critical infrastructure may use both information technology
(IT) and operational technology (OT) systems in doing their jobs. IT systems include any
equipment or interconnected system of equipment that can collect, store, process, maintain,
share , transmit, or dispose of data. OT systems, on the other hand, are programmable
systems or devices that interact with the physical environment, such as industrial control
systems, transportation systems, and physical access control systems. Initially, OT s ystems
were isolated, ran proprietary control protocols, and used specialized hardware and
software. However, as OT systems are adopting IT solutions to promote connectivity and
remote access capabilities, they have started to resemble IT systems. It is im portant for
agencies to protect operational technology from being compromised and accessed without
authorization to avoid the disruption of critical devices or functions. Figure 1 depicts common
types of IT and operational technology, and how they differ.

Figure 2. Common Types of Information Technology and Operational Technology

21 In May 2020, the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
released a joint alert with the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre regarding advanced persistent
threat groups exploiting COVID -19 to target health care an d essential services. The alert warned that advanced
persistent threat groups were frequently targeting organizations in order to collect bulk personal information,
intellectual property, and intelligence that aligns with national priorities. See GAO, HHS Defined Roles and
Responsibilities, but Can Further Improve Collaboration , GAO -21 -403 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2021). In
February 2022, the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infra structure Security Agency
released a joint alert with cybersecurity authorities in Australia and the United Kingdom related to incidents of
ransomware against critical infrastructure sectors . These ransomware groups were diversifying their approaches
to extort money and were targeting organizations of all sizes.


4.1 Key Cybersecurity Guidance and Criteria for Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Many countries have specific laws or guidance to protect such critical infrastructure sectors.
In ma ny cases, the guidance and criteria used to audit critical infrastructure sectors is broad
and may cover many (or all) critical infrastructure sectors. Cybersecurity guidance and
legislation related to the critical infrastructure sectors may include releva nt laws in each
country (refer to chapter 3), each country’s internal auditing standards, and international
guidance documents relevant to the audit.

For example, to better protect against cyber threats, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) facilitated the development of a voluntary framework of cybersecurity
standards and procedures for sectors to use. Specifically, in February 2014, NIST published
the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity , which has been tran slated
into seven languages and has been adopted by many governments around the world. 22 NIST
has also provided crosswalks — known as online informative references — between elements
in NIST documents and those found in other guidance such as ISO standards, CO BIT 2019,
and others. 23 Much of the guidance specific to critical infrastructure is discussed in chapter
3 of this guide.

4.2 Challenges, Risks, and Threats for Critical Infrastructure Sectors
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the threats that critical
infrastructure sectors face can vary from natural disasters, human -made accidents, or
malicious actions. Examples of these threats can include the following:

• Geophysical, cl imatological, meteorological events, and other natural
disasters : drought, earthquakes, extreme heat, extreme precipitation, floods,
geomagnetic storms, hurricanes, tropical cyclones, volcanic eruptions, wildfires

• Technological and industrial accidents, m alfunctions, and other unscheduled
disruptions : aging infrastructure, chemical spills, equipment malfunction,
hazardous substance releases, industrial fires, large scale power outages, structural

• Criminal and terrorist incidents, foreign interfer ence operations, and other
malicious actions :
• Cybersecurity incidents such as denial of service attacks, malware,
phishing active shooter incidents,
• Supply chain attacks, vandalism, theft
• Foreign influence to spread misinformation or undermine democratic
processes, untrusted foreign investment that give foreign powers undue
influence over a nation’s critical infrastructure, property damage

22National Institute of Standards and Technology , Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
(Gaithersburg, MD: Fe b. 12, 2014). Version 1.1 of the framework was issued Apr. 16, 2018. 23See National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Online Informative References Program , at olir .


4.2.1 Cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure sectors
As noted above, cybersecurity and other technolo gy -based incidents are key threats to
critical infrastructure sectors. Ineffective protection of cyber assets from threats can increase
the likelihood of security incidents and cyberattacks that disrupt critical operations; lead to
inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information;
and threaten national security, economic well -being, and public health and safety. Cyber
threats to critical infrastructure can be classified as unintentional or intentional:

• Unintenti onal or non -adversarial threat sources may include failures in equipment or
software due to aging, resource depletion, and errors made by end users. They also
include the effects of natural disasters and failures of critical technological
infrastructure on whi ch the organization depends but that are outside of the control
of the organization.

• Intentional or adversarial threats may include corrupt employees, criminal groups,
terrorists, and nations that seek to leverage the organization’s dependence on cyber
resources (e.g., information in electronic form, information and communications
technologies, and the communications and information -handling capabilities
provided by those technologies). These threat adversaries vary in terms of their
capabilities, their wi llingness to act, and their motives, which can include seeking
monetary gain or seeking an economic, political, or military advantage. Because
systems and networks used by critical infrastructure sectors are often interconnected
with other systems and the internet, they can be vulnerable to disruptions in service
due to cyberattacks. Critical infrastructures in general are becoming more reliant on
technology, which may leave them more vulnerable to attack. Attackers may use
various tactics, such as gaining an initial foothold on target systems, running
malicious code, and moving through various systems — to exploit vulnerabilities and
position themselves to achieve their ultimate goals. The table below includes
examples of common intentional cyberattack tactic s for both IT and OT systems.

Table 1: Common Methods of Intentional Cyber Exploits

Exploit Description
Watering hole A method by which threat actors exploit the vulnerabilities of carefully
selected websites frequented by users of the targeted system. Malware
is then injected to the targeted system via the compromised websites.
Phishing and
A digital fo rm of social engineering that uses authentic -looking emails,
websites, or instant messages to get users to download malware, open
malicious attachments, or open links that direct them to a website that
requests information or executes malicious code.
Cre dentials
An exploit that takes advantage of a system’s insufficient user
authentication and/or any elements of cybersecurity supporting it, to
include not limiting the number of failed login attempts, the use of hard –
coded credentials, and the use o f a broken or risky cryptographic
Trusted third
An exploit that takes advantage of the security vulnerabilities of trusted
third parties to gain access to an otherwise secure system.


Classic buffer
An exploit that involves the intentional transmission of more data than a
program’s input buff er can hold, leading to the deletion of critical data
and subsequent execution of malicious code.
An exploit that takes advantage of a network employing insufficient
encryption when either storing or transmitting data, enabling adversaries
to read and/or modify the data stream.
An exploit that involves the a lteration of a database search in a web –
based application, which can be used to obtain unauthorized access to
sensitive information in a database, resulting in data loss or corruption,
denial of service, or complete host takeover.
comman d
An exploit that takes advantage of a system’s inability to properly
neutralize special elements used in operating system commands,
allowing the adversaries to execute unexpected commands on the
system by either modifying already evoked command s or evoking their
Cross -site
An exploit that uses third -party web resources to run lines of
programming code (referred to as scripts) within the victim’s web browser
or scriptable application. This occurs when a user, using a browser, visits
a malicious website or clicks a malicious l ink. The most dangerous
consequences can occur when this method is used to exploit additional
vulnerabilities that may permit an adversary to steal cookies (data
exchanged between a web server and a browser), log key strokes,
capture screen shots, discover and collect network information, or
remotely access and control the victim’s machine.
Cross -site
An exploit that takes advantage of an application that cannot, or does
not, sufficiently verify whether a well -formed, valid, consistent re quest
was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request, tricking
the victim into executing a falsified request that results in the system or
data being compromised.
Path traversal An exploit that seeks to gain access to files outside of a restricted
directory by modifying the directory pathname in an application that does
not properly neutralize special elements (e.g. ‘…’, ‘/’, ‘…/’, etc.) within the
An exploit where malicious code is inserted that leads to unexpected
integer overflow, or wraparound, which can be used by adversaries to
control looping or make security decisions in order to cause program
crashes, memory corruption, or the execution of a rbitrary code via buffer
format string
Adversaries manipulate externally -controlled format strings in print -style
functions to gain access to information and/or execute unauthorized
code or commands.
Open redirect An exploit where the victim is tricked into selecting a URL (website
location) that has been modified to direct them to an external, malicious
site which may contain malware that can compromises the victim’s
Heap -based
Similar t o classic buffer overflow, but the buffer that is overwritten is
allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the
buffer was allocated using a memory allocation routine, such as “malloc


upload of files
An exploit tha t takes advantage of insufficient upload restrictions,
enabling adversaries to upload malware (e.g., .php) in place of the
intended file type (e.g., .jpg).
Inclusion of
An exploit that uses trusted, third -party execut able functionality (e.g.,
web widget or library) as a means of executing malicious code in
software whose protection mechanisms are unable to determine whether
functionality is from a trusted source, modified in transit, or being
and certificate
Exploits facilitated via the issuance of fraudulent digital certificates (e.g.,
transport layer security and Secure Socket Layer). Adversaries use
these certificates to establish secure connections with the target
organiz ation or individual by mimicking a trusted third party.
Hybrid of
An exploit combines elements of two or more of the aforementioned

Source: GAO, C ritical Infrastructure Protection: Measures Needed to Assess Agencies’
Promotion of the Cybersecurity Framework , GAO -16 -152 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17,

Examples of Recent Cybersecurity Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Sectors

The consequences of cyberattacks a nd incidents have already been felt by several critical
infrastructure sectors:

Energy sector

In the 2015 cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid, attackers issued unauthorized
commands to open the breakers at substations that three regional electricit y utilities
managed, causing a loss of power to about 225,000 customers. It appears the attackers
used phishing emails to entice users to download malware onto their computers.

Transportation sector

In May 2021, the U.S. -based Colonial Pipeline Company announced that it was the victim
of a ransomware attack that led to temporary disruption in the delivery of ga soline and other
petroleum products across much of the southeast U.S.

Prior to the disruption, the U.S. GAO issued several findings and recommendations aimed
at addressing significant weaknesses in p ipeline security program management within the
energy sector. For example, the GAO found that the government agency in charge of
pipeline security efforts had no process for determining when to update guidelines for
pipeline operators and needed to update its method for assessing risks.

The audit team made 10 recommendations related to these findings, including establishing
better processes for updating guidelines and assessing risks. As of May 2022, two of the 10
recommendations remain open. Specifically , the U.S. GAO had recommended that the
government agency in charge of U.S. pipeline security incorporate additional risk data into


its analysis of the relative risk of critical pipeline system, and coordinate an external peer
review of this risk analysis. If these steps were completed, there would be a better
understanding of the relative risk among pipeline systems using the most comprehensive
and accurate threat, vulnerability, and consequence information.

Communications sector

In February 2022, Viasat , Inc. began experiencing outages with its European satellite
internet service near the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, according to press
reporting. According to Viasat, the disruption was triggered by an attacker running
destructive commands ag ainst Viasat network devices. In its forensic analysis of the
incident, Sentinel Labs noted that the malware used in this attack shares some similarities
with malware used in attacks attributed to the Russian government. As a result of the attack,
a German wind turbine manufacturer explained that remote operation of more than 5,000
turbines had been affected. In March 2022, CISA and the FBI warned critical infrastructure
and other organizations of possible threats to U.S. and international satellite communi cation

Water and wastewater sector

In February 2021, the United States Department of Homeland Security issued an alert
explaining that cyber threat actors obtained unauthorized access to a U.S. water treatment
facility’s industrial controls sys tems and attempted to increase the amount of a caustic
chemical that is used as part of the water treatment process. 1 According to the Department
of Homeland Security, threat actors likely accessed systems by exploiting cybersecurity
weakness, including po or password security and an outdated operating system.

The alert recommended several recommendations to assist organizations in the water
sector, including:

• cyber hygiene measures, including updating to the latest version of the operating
systems and using strong passwords;
• physical security measures, such as installing systems hat physically prevent
dangerous conditions from occurring in the event of a cyberattack; and
• recommendations on the use and implementation of the specific software the
hacker u sed to gain access to the systems.

Healthcare and public health sector

In October 2020, during the COVID -19 pandemic, cybercriminals targeted several
organizations in the healthcare and publ ic health sector. The cybercriminals disseminated
the malicious software using phishing campaigns that contain either links to malicious
websites that host the malware or attachments with the malware. In response to these
attacks, the U.S. Department of Ho meland Security made several recommendations to
organizations in the sector, including maintaining business continuity plans, performing
cyber hygiene practices such as patch management, and ensuring that staff are trained.


Threats to multiple sectors

• In June 2017, the “NotPetya” malware was discovered. After NotPetya infected a
machine on which that software was installed, it was capable of automatically spreading
through a network and infecting other machines. NotPetya spread worldwide, damaged
compute rs used in critical infrastructure, and is estimated to have caused about $10
billion in damages globally. For example, it had infected organizations in several sectors
in the U.S., including finance, transportation, energy, commercial facilities, and
heal thcare. The “NotPetya” malware exploited existing vulnerabilities in computer
software or networks to encrypt files and allowed attackers to gain privileged rights and
encrypt essential files, thus making the infected Windows computers unusable.

• In Decem ber 2020, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued an emergency
directive and alert explaining that an advanced persistent threat actor had compromised
the supply chain of a network management software suite and inserted a “backdoor” —
a malicious pro gram that can potentially give an intruder remote access to an infected
computer — into a genuine version of that software product. The malicious actor then
used this backdoor, among other techniques, to initiate a cyberattack campaign against
U.S. governmen t agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector

4.3 Considerations for Auditing Critical Infrastructure Sectors
When auditing critical infrastructure sectors, it is important to identify key vulnerabilities for
that sector, ide ntify stakeholder and regulatory roles for the sector, and identify potential
audit findings, as described in more detail below.

4.3.1 Identifying Key Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Actors
It is important that auditors have a sufficient understanding of the technologies used by
a critical infrastructure sector, or key stakeholders or companies within that sector, to
identify potential areas of vulnerability. It is also important that audit teams analyze the
threats and hazards described a bove to determine how likely they are to occur and what
their potential impacts on the critical infrastructure sector might be.

Each sector uses unique systems and technology to accomplish its goals, but the
potential vulnerabilities across the sectors ma y be similar. However, the consequences
and impacts of cybersecurity attacks may be different depending on the technologies
used by that sector. Examples of these are described in more detail below.

Energy sector. Figure 2 depicts key potential vulnerabil ities for a provider in the
energy critical infrastructure sector. The sophisticated computer systems that
pipeline operations rely on are vulnerable to various cyber threats, including
malicious actors infiltrating business or control systems. For example , an attacker
could infiltrate a pipeline’s operational systems via the internet or other


communication pathways to potentially disrupt its service and cause spills, releases,
explosions, or fires.

Figure 3. U.S. Natural Gas and Oil Pipeline Systems’ Basi c Components and
Examples of Vulnerabilities

Transportation sector. Modern airplanes are equipped with networks and systems that
share data with the pilots, passengers, maintenance crews, other aircraft, and air -traffic
controllers (as depicted in fig. 3). These networks and systems share data in ways that were
not previously feasible, which creates risk in this sector for entities that have not analyzed
the implications of and increasing connectivity in an environment of evolving cyber threats.
Vulnera bilities could occur due to (1) not applying modifications (patches) to commercial
software, (2) insecure supply chains, (3) malicious software uploads, (4) outdated systems
on legacy airplanes, and (5) flight data spoofing.


Figure 4. Key Systems Connec tions to Commercial Airplanes

Financial services sector. The composition of the financial services sector extends beyond
the categories of financial services to include a network of essential specialized service
organizations and service providers that support the sector in its efforts to provide a trusted
services environment. For example, the financial services sector has become more
dependent on outsourcing certain activities — such as systems and applications, hardware
and software, and technically sk illed personnel — to third -party providers that are now an
indispensable part of the sector’s infrastructure. Further, mobile payment applications allow
consumers to use their smartphones or other mobile devices to make purchases and
transfer money instead o f relying on the physical use of cash, checks, or credit and debit
cards. Due in part to the introduction of these new technologies, the financial services sector
has even stronger need for information technology capabilities and support from supply
chain partners and third -party service providers. A successful widespread cyberattack could
erode public confidence in financial institutions, deny businesses and individuals access to
their funds, result in the loss of funds, or affect the integrity of financia l information.

Regardless of which sector is being audited, the team must understand the systems and
technology used in that sector, and the potential threats and vulnerabilities. This may be
accomplished by reviewing any documentation developed by organi zations within the
sector, completing physical reviews of companies or locations, and interviewing
organizations within the sector. To identify vulnerabilities, an auditor may review prior reports
on cyber -based threats facing the sector as well as the thr eats identified by cybersecurity
organizations. 24 Auditors should also interview subject matter experts to confirm their
understanding of threats and vulnerabilities.
24The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has developed several resources that may assist auditors in
evaluating IT and OT. For example, the Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool is a stand -alone desktop application that
guides asset owners and operators thr ough a systematic process of evaluating IT and OT systems, and includes
a ransomware readiness assessment. See -security -evalu ation –
tool -csetr .


4.3.2 Identifying Stakeholder Roles and Regulatory Frameworks
The effort to strengthen critic al infrastructure security depends on the extent to which public
and private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators to make risk -informed
decisions collaboratively. It also depends on their ability to share information regularly to
ensure that risk is managed properly. In certain countries such as the United States, the
private sector owns the majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure instead of the
government. Thus, it is vital that the public and private sectors work together to protec t these
assets and systems.

Each country may oversee critical infrastructure sectors differently. In some cases, there
may be a body in charge of regulating all activity for that sector. In other cases, there may
be a government body that collaborates wi th critical infrastructure owners and operators and
provides government support as needed but does not have a direct oversight role.
Additionally, a particular country may not have regulators or regulatory bodies overseeing
or providing support for a secto r. Before beginning an audit, it is important that auditors
understand the roles and responsibilities for protecting the sector that they are evaluating.

For example, in the United States, efforts to protect various critical infrastructure sectors are
carried out through the joint efforts of multiple components of a public -private partnership
model, including government agencies. These federal government agencies, referred to as
“sector risk management agencies,” prioritize and coordinate security and r esilience efforts
and carry out incident management responsibilities for their assigned critical infrastructure
sectors. For example:

These critical infrastructure sectors may be regulated in different ways. For example, the
electricity subsector of the energy sector is highly regulated in the United States. The U.S.
Department of Energy is responsible for, among other things, collaborating with critical
infrastructure owners and operators, identifying vulnerabilities, and helping to mitigate
incidents. T he U.S. Department of Homeland Security assists those efforts by coordinating
the overall federal effort to promote the security and resilience of the nation’s critical
infrastructure. In addition to those agencies, U.S. federal and state authorities play key roles
in regulating the reliability of the grid, which can be impaired by cybersecurity attacks. For
example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is the federal regulator of interstate
transmission of electricity with responsibility to review and approve standards to provide for
the reliable operation of the bulk power system. The commission also oversees the North
American Electricity Reliability Corporation, which is responsible for conducting reliability
assessments and enforcing mandatory stand ards to ensure the reliability of the bulk power

These agencies and organizations provide cybersecurity support to operators in this critical
infrastructure sector. For example, the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security offer
services aimed at helping grid owners and operators assess cybersecurity risks and perform
forensic analysis. They have also developed policies, strategies, and plans to define their
roles and responsibilities for responding to and recovering from grid cybersecurity inc idents.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has also performed regulatory activities aimed


at addressing grid cybersecurity risks, such as approving mandatory cybersecurity
standards, and enforcing regulatory requirements through imposition of civil p enalties.

Other sectors may not be as regulated:

• In the transportation sector , the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration is co -lead,
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, on infrastructure protection activities
specifically for the avionics subse ctor. The Federal Aviation Administration is
responsible for the safety and oversight of commercial aviation, which includes the
certification and oversight of all US commercial aviation products and commercial
entities, while the Department of Homeland Se curity is responsible for coordinating
federal government activities addressing aviation security.

• In the financial services sector , the U.S. Department of the Treasury is the sector
risk management agency charged with coordinating the partnership between private
sector firms and the federal government. However, Treasury works with other
stakeholders, such as federal regulators and industry groups, to enhance the
security of the financial services sector and assist members of the sector to
collaborate to m itigate risks.

4.3.3 Identifying Potential Challenges or Audit Findings
In order to identify findings and areas for improvement, an audit team should use the
information they gathered about the potential vulnerabilities, as well as the information about
the re gulatory or oversight framework, to determine how to design the audit and which
methodologies to use.

If there is an oversight body, an audit team may work to identify how effective the
cybersecurity oversight has been for that sector. If there is no over sight body, the audit team
may consider evaluating the cybersecurity policies and procedures for key companies or
organizations within the critical infrastructure sector.

Key Questions to Ask during an Audit

• If there is an oversight or regulatory body:
o Oversight :
▪ Have they established an oversight program that includes cybersecurity?
Have they completed a risk assessment related to the sector? Have they
defined program objectives based on that risk assessment? Do they have
control activities related to the identified risks?
▪ Do they oversee/evaluate the implementation of cybersecurity and data
protection controls? If so, how? Did they produce oversight reports or
other documents? If not, why not?
o Guidance : Have government or other regulatory bo dies identified guidance
(such as the NIST cybersecurity framework), or developed guidance, that could
be used in the particular sector(s)?
▪ Have they taken steps to encourage the use of relevant guidance?


▪ Have they taken steps to determine whether organiza tions in the sector
follow the relevant guidance (e.g., by using surveys, reporting,
assessments, or other mechanisms)?
▪ If the oversight body has developed guidance, does that guidance reflect
the current threat environment? Does the guidance reflect requi rements
in law or best practices from applicable standards (such as ISO/IEC
27001:2013, COBIT 2019, and the NIST Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity )?
o Enforcement : Do they have enforcement authority? If so, do they take
enforcemen t measures?
o Workforce : Do they have the appropriate staff/skills to oversee cybersecurity
and data protection policies and procedures? Do they provide appropriate
training to staff, and how often?
o Collaboration : Have supporting organizations assisted in id entifying
improvements that could be made? Have roles and responsibilities been
identified? If applicable, have participating organizations documented their
agreement regarding how they will collaborate? How do sector stakeholders
share security -related in formation?
• If there is no government oversight body, an auditor may determine whether the
critical infrastructure owner/operator has a cybersecurity risk management program
and/or has performed a cybersecurity risk assessment using the criteria identified
above and in chapter 3 of this document.

For example, in October 2020, the U.S. GAO reported that, as part of its responsibilities in
the transportation sector , the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should prioritize
oversight of evolving cyber t hreats and increasing connectivity between airplanes and other
systems: 25
• Oversight : FAA had not conducted an assessment of the risks to avionics systems
to determine the relative priority of cybersecurity risks to avionics systems versus
other safety concerns in its oversight program. Without such an assessment, the
GAO reported that FAA may not be able to appropriately strengthen its oversight
program specific to avionics systems cybersecurity issues ;
• Guidance : FAA had established a process for the certification and oversight of U.S.
commercial airplanes, including their operations ;
• Enforcement : FAA’s monitoring of the implementation of avionics cybersecurity
controls in airplanes that are deployed in active service with air carriers does not
include policies or procedures for periodic testing. The GAO reported that until FAA
develops policies and procedures for periodic testing as part of its monitoring
process, it may be unable to ensure that cybersecurity controls remain effective in
mitigatin g evolving threats in deployed airplanes ;
• Workforce : FAA did not have a staff training program specific to avionics
cybersecurity, and none of the agency’s certification staff are required to take
cybersecurity training tailored to their oversight role. Th e GAO reported that until FAA
establishes a staffing and training program appropriately tailored to avionics
25GAO, Aviation Cybersecurity: FAA Should Fully Implement Key Practices to Strengthen Its Oversight of
Avionics Risks , GAO -21 -86 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 9, 2020).


cybersecurity, the agency may not have the expertise necessary to address the
increasing cybersecurity risks to these systems ; and
• Collaboration : T he GAO also reported that FAA coordinated with other key federal
agencies and industry to address aviation cybersecurity issues. However, FAA’s
internal coordination activities did not fully reflect key collaboration practices. For
example, FAA had not est ablished a tracking program for monitoring progress on
issues raised at meetings, and the oversight was not supported through dedicated
agency resources in its budget. The GAO reported that until FAA prioritizes
coordination efforts based on that assessmen t, it may not be allocating resources
and coordinating on risks as effectively as it could.

4.4 Example Audit Reports on Critical Infrastructure
4.4.1 Government -Wide Critical Infrastructure Reviews
• GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Agencies Need to Assess Adoption of
Cybersecurity Guidance , GAO -22 -105103 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2022).
• GAO, High -Risk Series: Federal Government Needs to Urgently Pursue Critical
Actions to Address Major Cy bersecurity Challenges , GAO -21 -288 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 24, 2021).
• GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Additional Actions Needed to Identify
Framework Adoption and Resulting Improvements , GAO -20 -299 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 25, 2020).
• GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Additional Actions Are Essential for
Assessing Cybersecurity Framework Adoption , GAO -18 -211 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 15, 2018).
• GAO, C ritical Infrastructure Protection: Measures Needed to Assess Agencies’
Promotion of the Cybersecurity Framework , GAO -16 -152 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
17, 2015).
• GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector -Specific Agencies Need to Better
Measure Cybersecurity Progress , GAO -16 -79 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2015).

4.1.1. Sector -Specific Critical Infrastructure Reviews

• Communication: GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Assess the
Effectiveness of its Actions to Support the Communications Secto r, GAO -22 -104462
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 2021).
• Energy:

o GAO, Electricity Grid Cybersecurity: DOE Needs to Ensure Its Plans Fully
Address Risks to Distribution Systems , GAO -21 -81 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
18, 2021).
o GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to Address
Significant Weaknesses in TSA’s Pipeline Security Program Management ,
GAO -19 -48 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2018).


• Transportation: GAO, Aviation Cybersecurity: FAA Should Fully Implement Key
Practices to Strengthen Its Oversight of Avionics Risks , GAO -21 -86 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 9, 2020).

• Financial services: GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Treasury Needs to
Improve Tracking of Financial Sector Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation Efforts , GAO -20 –
631 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2020).


Appendix – Acronyms and abbreviations

ANAO Australian National Audit Office
BAI Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea
CAF Cyber Assessment Framework
CCPA California Consumer Privacy Act
CEH Certified Ethical Hacker
CERT Computer Emergency Response Teams
CESG Canada Education Savings Grant
CII Critical information infrastructure
CIS Center for Internet Security
CISA Certified Information Systems Auditor
CISM Certified Information Security Manager
CISSP Certified Information Systems Security Professional
CMM Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations
CNI Critical National Infrastructure
COBIT Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies
CRISC Certified in Risk and Information Systems Control
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team
CySA+ CompTIA Cybersecurity Analyst
DEDJTR Australia Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Tr ansport and
DELWP Australia Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning
DHHS Australia Department of Health and Human Services
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DJR Australia Department of Justice and Regulation
DORA Digital Operational Resilience Act
DRS Disaster Recovery System
DSP Digital Services Providers
ENISA The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
FAA U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
GAO United States Government Accountability Office
GCI The Global Cybersecurity Index
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
GSEC GIAC Security Essentials Certification
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IS Information System
ISMS Information Security Management System
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITAF Information Technology Assurance Framework
ITIL Information Technology Infrastructure Library
ITU International Telecommunication Union
KLID Korean Local Information Research and Development Institute
MMA Military Manpower Administrati on
MOSPA Ministry of Security and Public Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization


NCAF National Capabilities Assessment Framework
NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
NCS National Cybersecurity
NCS National Cybersecurity Systems
NDRF National Disaster Recovery Framework
NIMS National Incident Management Structure
NIS Network and Information Systems
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OES Operator of Essential Services
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PMBOK Project Management Body of Knowledge
PYME Small and Medium Enterprise (for its acronyms in Spanish: Pequeña Y
Mediana Empresa ).
RSF Recovery Support Function
SAI Supreme Audit Institution
SCCs Sector Coordinating Council
SETIC Information Technology Infrastructure Secretariat
SIEM security information and event management
SIM3 Security Incident Management Maturity Model
SQL Structured Query Language
SSAs Sector Specific Agencies
TCA Turkish Court of Accounts
TCU Tribunal de Contas da União (Federal Court of Accounts – Brazil)

Nota: El texto extraído es sólo una aproximación del contenido del documento, puede contener caracteres especiales no legibles.

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